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Remember the Ladies and the
Children Too
CRAWFORD’S IMPACT ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
AND CHILD ABUSE CASES
Myrna Raeder †
I.

INTRODUCTION

Crawford’s 1 testimonial approach has had a dramatic
impact on domestic violence and child abuse cases. This should
come as no surprise, since Crawford’s view of the Confrontation
Clause is grounded in the policies and practices in place in
1791, without any regard for weighing or interpreting those
underlying confrontation concerns through the lens of the
modern era. A purely historic approach to confrontation
ignores the significant societal changes that have resulted in
the criminalization of domestic violence and child abuse.
Original intent focusing exclusively on 1791 retreats to a time
when voices of outsiders, including women and children were
not included in creating evidentiary or constitutional policy. 2
Even though Crawford involved a state conviction, the
opinion does not even look to practice in 1868 when the
Fourteenth Amendment “extended the strictures of the Fifth
and Sixth Amendments to the States.” 3 In 1791, the United
States had no organized police force, let alone medical or
forensic protocols in criminal cases. Crawford also ignores the
impact of videotape, two-way television, telephone, email,
audiotape, typewriters, and computerized records in creating
†
Professor, Southwestern University School of Law. This article benefited
from comments I received at Brooklyn Law School’s Crawford symposium. © 2005
Myrna Raeder.
1
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
2
Feminist jurisprudence and critical race theory critique the absence of
women and minorities from policymaking. See, e.g., Myrna Raeder, Introduction to
Symposium on Evidence Law: Race and Gender in Evidentiary Policy, and The New
Courtroom, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 157, 158-63 (1999) (discussing literature).
3
Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 65 (2000) (mentioning practice at both
timeframes).
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easy access to out-of-court statements that did not exist in
1791. Today, technology provides the means of producing all
manner of hearsay that was not available in an earlier age.
Extensive use of hearsay is now the norm, not the exception.
Moreover, competency rules and evidentiary standards were
much more restrictive then, resulting in an additional
reliability check that does not exist in a world of expansive
hearsay exceptions.
Ironically, in 1791, effective crossexamination was often limited because the defendant either
had no counsel or counsel’s cross-examination was restricted. 4
Jury trials of the time were quite short; often less than one
hour. 5 Thus, the attempt to impose the 1791 Confrontation
Clause on the twenty-first century criminal justice system
without consideration of the many societal differences was sure
to create the havoc that Crawford has wrought.
In domestic violence cases, a purely historic approach
ignores the reality that in 1791 the “Rule of Thumb” was
common: “as [the husband] is to answer for her misbehavior,
the law thought it reasonable to entrust him with this power of
chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to
correct his apprentices or children.” 6 Crawford’s originalist
approach eschews the question of what the founding fathers
would have thought of a world that espouses zero tolerance for
domestic violence, one in which 911 protocols are routine, as
are pro- or mandatory-arrest policies, no-drop prosecutions,
criminal contempt convictions for violation of protective orders,
expansive hearsay exceptions and in some states reporting
requirements for medical personnel. Instead, under Crawford,
the confrontation right looks backward, not forward.
Similarly, child abuse prosecutions were a rarity in
1791. Not only was molestation not recognized as a significant
societal problem, but the old adage that children should be seen
but not heard extended to the courtroom. Even well into the
twentieth century, statutes often disqualified children under
seven from testifying, and in some states children as old as
twelve could be barred. In contrast, minimal competency rules
now dominate, and some states permit unsworn testimony of
4
See, e.g., John H. Langbein, Historical Foundations of the Law of Evidence:
A View from the Ryder Sources, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1197 n.140 (1996) (discussing
sources indicating between a quarter and a third of defendants had counsel at the Old
Bailey by the end of the eighteenth century).
5
John H. Langbein, Remarks to AALS Evidence Section (Jan. 2005).
6
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 444
(Chicago & London, Univ. of Chicago Press 1765).
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child abuse victims, 7 or simply declare child victims as
Today, mandatory reporting
competent to testify. 8
requirements exist in all fifty states, eighteen of which include
anyone who suspects child abuse. 9 Therapeutic and forensic
interviewing by doctors, social workers and psychologists who
are employed by the state or referred by agents of the state are
common. In addition, child hearsay exceptions and expansive
interpretation of firmly rooted exceptions routinely permit the
voices of children to be heard, whether or not they testify. Yet,
the return to 1791 silences the voices of children who do not
appear at trial, unless they were subject to prior crossexamination or the right has been forfeited.
Ironically, looking backwards to determine what is
“testimonial” provides no more certainty than the earlier
Roberts 10 reliability test. For example, one judge, trying to
evaluate whether statements by a nontestifying child to her
grandmother concerning sexual assault perpetrated upon her
by a juvenile were testimonial, noted “[t]he quagmire we are
left in, however, is that the Crawford Court does not pinpoint a
specific definition of the amorphous concept of what
‘testimonial statements’ might include.” 11 Not only are courts
reaching opposite conclusions on similar facts, but the very
reach of the Confrontation Clause is in doubt. On the one
hand, if the Court ultimately defines testimonial narrowly, and
also jettisons any confrontation test for nontestimonial
hearsay, the defendant will have even less ability to exclude
hearsay than under Roberts 12 and its progeny. On the other
hand, if testimonial hearsay is interpreted broadly, the hearsay
that is excluded may confound society’s ability to hold some
types of perpetrators responsible for their crimes, unless
forfeiture of the confrontation right is also viewed expansively.
As a feminist who is also concerned about the
defendant’s right to confrontation, I have long pondered the
7
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 90.605(2) (1999); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 60.20(2)
(McKinney 1999).
8
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-25-3(c) (1999); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-86h (1999);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-410 (1999); see generally Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and
the Oath: Empirical Evidence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 1017 (2000).
9
See NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
INFORMATION, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD
MALTREATMENT REPORTING LAWS 3 (2002).
10
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
11
In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1035 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
12
Roberts, 448 U.S. 56.
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proper balance to ensure that the voices of women and children
are heard, without eviscerating the ability of the defendant to
confront live complainants, and not just second hand witnesses.
I face a tension between my desire to lower the incidence of
domestic violence and child abuse and my view that
testimonial hearsay should be interpreted broadly in light of
technology and the adoption by states of expansive hearsay
exceptions that make the government responsible for the
existence of admissible hearsay. While it is obvious that
interrogation produces testimonial hearsay, there has been
little, if any, discussion of the government’s role in creating the
hearsay exceptions that permit private individuals to make
accusations that in 1791 would not have been admissible. In
other words, it is not helpful to define testimonial statements
by reference to rules that do not contemplate the admission of
most hearsay that is currently received at trial. Yet, Crawford
did not ask how the drafters would have viewed the
constitutionality of admitting of such legislatively approved
hearsay in the absence of the declarant. Thus, beyond the
issue of 911 calls to the police is the admission of purely private
statements that would not have seen the light of day in 1791.
People v. Moscat, 13 one of the early influential cases
finding a 911 call by a domestic violence victim seeking rescue
was not testimonial, astutely recognized that the historically
grounded testimonial approach did not provide the urgent
guidance needed to apply the Sixth Amendment to a twentyfirst century world. However, my longstanding concern that
cross-examination is a significant right that has been
eviscerated by the Roberts approach, leads me to reject
Moscat’s expansive exclusion of excited utterances from the
protection of the Confrontation Clause. Yet, the difficulty with
any approach that broadly interprets testimonial statements is
that under Crawford it silences the voices of women and
children by regressing to a world that typically treated them as
chattel. While I am not as optimistic as Professor Mosteller
that Crawford will eventually result in more pretrial crossexamination and trial witnesses, 14 I view this transition to a
new mode of Confrontation Clause analysis as an opportunity
to rethink how we approach domestic violence and child abuse
cases.
13

777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 878 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
See Robert P. Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and
Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 533-614 (2005).
14
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This essay critiques the testimonial approach, presents
my view of how testimonial statements should be defined, and
discusses current trends affecting domestic violence and child
abuse litigation. I also explore forfeiture, waiver, and opening
the door to testimonial statements. Rather than fighting
Crawford, holding out for the most strained interpretations
that permit the use of statements by denying their testimonial
effect, I suggest embracing evidentiary creativity, exploring
new hearsay exceptions for declarants who testify, determining
whether Rule 404(b) is being adequately used, 15 and expanding
expert testimony to permit background about battering and
child abuse. 16
More globally, I propose restructuring domestic violence
prosecutions into separate tracks in order to devote scarce
criminal justice resources to the most dangerous offenders.
The Risky Violent Offender prosecutorial track would apply to
cases resulting in death, rape or other serious physical injuries,
weapons-based offenses, multiple victim abusers, defendants
with previous convictions, and defendants who meet defined
criteria of dangerousness. Other crimes typically charged as
misdemeanors would be further separated into a Diversionary
and a Middle track for all other cases. Finally, I suggest best
practices that are most likely to permit child testimony.
II.

THE CRAWFORD FRAMEWORK

A.

Crawford’s Testimonial/Nontestimonial Divide

As I have already alluded, my disagreement with the
testimonial approach to confrontation is that the common law
15
I have long been opposed to outright propensity evidence in sexual abuse
cases. See Myrna S. Raeder, A.B.A. Criminal Justice Section Report to the House of
Delegates, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 343 (1995) (supporting resolution opposing Federal
Rules of Evidence 413-415). However, I support the use of Rule 404(b) in such cases.
See Myrna S. Raeder, The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson
and Beyond, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1463, 1493 (1996) [hereinafter Raeder, Simpson and
Beyond].
16
See Tom Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence
Against Women, 36 IND. L. REV. 687, 709 n.76 (2003) [hereinafter Lininger, Evidentiary
Issues]; Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers after Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005)
[hereinafter Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers]; Myrna S. Raeder, The Better Way: The
Role of Batterers’ Profiles and Expert “Social Framework” Background in Cases
Implicating Domestic Violence, 68 U. COLO. L. REV. 147, 152 (1997) [hereinafter
Raeder, The Better Way]; Myrna S. Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword: Admissibility of
Battered Woman Syndrome By and Against Batterers in Cases Implicating Domestic
Violence, 67 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 790 (1996) [hereinafter Raeder, The Double-Edged
Sword]; Raeder, Simpson and Beyond, supra note 15.
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in 1791, or even that of 1868, should not set the standard.
Instead, the appropriate question is how the historic
Confrontation Clause concerns would be interpreted in light of
modern technology and context.
Just as the Eighth
Amendment is interpreted according to evolving standards of
decency, 17 the Confrontation Clause should not be tied to a
static framework. In other words, the approach in Maryland v.
Craig, 18 a case permitting an accommodation to permit a child
witness to testify out of the presence of the defendant, is more
suited to interpreting the Sixth Amendment in situations never
contemplated in 1791. As Craig noted, “[w]e have accordingly
interpreted the Confrontation Clause in a manner sensitive to
its purposes and sensitive to the necessities of trial and the
adversary process.” 19 Craig was quite practical, citing Kirby v.
United States 20 for the proposition that “[i]t is scarcely
necessary to say that to the rule that an accused is entitled to
be confronted with witnesses against him the admission of
dying declarations is an exception which arises from the
necessity of the case.” 21
Thus, Craig permitted denial of face-to-face
confrontation when “necessary to further an important public
policy and only where the reliability of the testimony is
otherwise assured.” 22 The opinion held “that a State’s interest
in the physical and psychological well-being of child abuse
victims may be sufficiently important to outweigh, at least in
some cases, a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in
court,” 23 a result not likely to have been reached in 1791. While
Craig may be discounted as not involving “core” confrontation
values, it is unclear why originalism applies selectively to some
parts of the amendment, and indeed only to some amendments.
It is not a sufficient response for originalists to tell us to
amend the Constitution if we don’t like where the doctrine
leads us. The power of the Constitution is that it is a living
document. 24 Crawford rejects that strength, and with it, the
17

See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 1190 (2005).
497 U.S. 836 (1990).
19
Id. at 849.
20
174 U.S. 47 (1899).
21
Id. at 61.
22
497 U.S. at 850.
23
Id. at 853.
24
See generally Eric R. Claeys, The Limits of Empirical Political Science and
the Possibilities of Living-Constitution Theory for a Retrospective on the Rehnquist
Court, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 737 (2003).
18
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flexibility that is essential to applying old doctrine to new
situations. Obviously, the Court will be called upon to clarify
its approach. At that point, the winners and losers will clearly
emerge, but in the meantime, we must adopt practices that
provide the best opportunity for successfully prosecuting
domestic violence and child abuse cases, while recognizing the
renewed importance of cross-examination. 25
Undoubtedly, Crawford’s ambiguity was caused by the
realpolitik of needing to obtain a majority, given that Justice
Scalia’s previous forays into Confrontation Clause originalism
were supported only by Justice Thomas. 26 Thus, Crawford
offers something for everyone. It mentioned three potential
standards:
1. “[E]x parte in-court testimony or its
functional equivalent—that is, material such as
affidavits,
custodial
examinations,
prior
testimony that the defendant was unable to
cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements
that declarants would reasonably expect to be
used prosecutorially.” 27
2. “[E]xtrajudicial statements . . . contained in
formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or
confessions.” 28
3. “[S]tatements that were made under
circumstances which would lead an objective
witness reasonably to believe that the statement
would be available for use at a later trial.” 29
These definitions vary significantly, and the selection of
one will have a major impact on the scope of the Confrontation
25
In the Roberts era, commentators, including myself, railed against the
devaluation of cross-examination in a doctrinal approach based on reliability. Now,
prior cross-examination has not simply regained its earlier luster, but has become a
rigid requirement for admission of testimonial statements by unavailable declarants.
26
See, e.g., Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 144 (1999).
27
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (quoting Brief for
Petitioner at 23, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)).
28
Id. at 51-52 (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas,
J., joined by Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment)).
29
Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for National Association of Criminal Defense
Lawyers et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 3, Crawford v. Washington,
541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410)).
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Clause.
The first definition focuses on the declarant’s
perspective in giving the statement, while the second gives
confrontation the narrowest content. Finally, the third appears
to afford the most protection for defendants by imposing an
objective witness standard. Crawford did not choose which
criteria to apply, offering the following guidance:
1. Statements taken by police officers in the
course of interrogations are testimonial under
even a narrow standard. 30
2. “The involvement of government officers in
the production of testimonial evidence presents
the same risk, whether the officers are police or
justices of the peace. In sum, even if the Sixth
Amendment is not solely concerned with
testimonial hearsay, that is its primary object,
and interrogations by law enforcement officers
fall squarely within that class.” 31
3. Interrogation extends “not only to express
questioning, but also to any words or actions on
the part of the police (other than those normally
attendant to arrest and custody) that the police
should know are reasonably likely to elicit an
incriminating response from the suspect.” 32
As a result, the Court held that Sylvia Crawford’s
“recorded statement, knowingly given in response to structured
police questioning, qualifies under any conceivable definition.” 33
Regardless of definition or scope, Crawford will catch some
statements to private individuals in its testimonial net.
Historically, Cobham’s hearsay was not the only out of court
statement introduced at Sir Walter Raleigh’s trial. 34 Shouldn’t
we be concerned about the statements of the pilot, Dyer, who
repeated what a Portugese gentleman had told him about the
King never being crowned, because Raleigh and Cobham were
30

Id. at 51.
Id. at 53.
32
Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 292 (1980) (cited in Crawford, 541
U.S. at 53 n.4).
33
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53.
34
See, e.g., Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., The Right of Confrontation and the
Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. BULL. 99, 100-01
(1972).
31
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going to cut his throat? 35 This statement was made to a private
individual, but was clearly accusatory, either from the
perspective of the declarant or a reasonable observer.
In the child abuse context, it is easy to posit examples of
testimonial hearsay when a private individual acts as an agent
or proxy for the government. This might occur in mandatory
reporting contexts or where a child welfare agency joins with
the prosecution to investigate cases. Arguably, some will view
Idaho v. Wright 36 as such a case. “In Wright, the Court found
that a defendant’s right to confrontation was violated by
admission of statements made in part by a child declarant to a
physician.” 37 Professor Margaret Berger has noted that the
Solicitor General admitted that the questioning in Wright was
by an agent of the prosecution in his amicus brief in White v.
Illinois, 38 another case discussing confrontation concerns raised
in a child abuse context:
[T]he questioning in that case [Wright] occurred after the declarant
had been taken into custody by the police, and the state court’s
characterization of the questioning suggest that it was designed to
develop evidence in a criminal case . . . . The questioning therefore
may be regarded as functionally equivalent to other forms of official
interrogation that result in statements by a “witness.” 39

While I am obviously not a fan of the testimonial
approach, now that it controls, I actually substantially agree
with Professor Richard Friedman’s broad view of what is
testimonial. 40 Yet, so much of hearsay is accusatory in the
colloquial understanding of that term, it is unlikely that the
Court would adopt a view that would significantly change the
way trials currently look.
In other words, a narrow
interpretation of testimonial is more in keeping with the
Court’s repeated admonition that the states are laboratories for
social change, and its prior approval of all manner of “firmly
rooted” hearsay. However, Crawford has made clear that as to
35

Id.; The Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, 2 Howell’s State Trials 1, 25 (1603).
497 U.S. 805 (1990).
37
See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalization of the Confrontation
Clause: A Proposal for a Prosecutorial Restraint Model, 76 MINN. L. REV. 557, 602
(1992).
38
502 U.S. 346 (1992).
39
Berger, supra note 37, at 613 n.191 (quoting Brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 28 n.18, White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346
(1992) (No. 90-6113)).
40
See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman, Adjusting to Crawford: High Court Decision
Restores Confrontation Clause Protection, 19 CRIM. JUST. 4 (2004).
36

320

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

the “core” concerns of the Confrontation Clause, a “broad
modern hearsay exception” will not save a testimonial
statement. 41
B.

Why Nontestimonial Hearsay Should Not Be Freely
Admitted at Trial

Crawford offers even less guidance as to how courts
should approach nontestimonial hearsay. Like a seer of old,
Justice Scalia obliquely pronounces: “Where nontestimonial
hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’
design to afford the States flexibility in their development of
hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that
exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny
altogether.” 42
What does this mean? If Roberts does not apply,
regardless of whether a broad or narrow view of testimonial
emerges, Crawford opens the possibility of large amounts of
hearsay receiving no constitutional second-look at all. Justice
Scalia savaged Roberts’ reliability test in Crawford: “The
[reliability] framework is so unpredictable that it fails to
provide meaningful protection from even core confrontation
violations.
Reliability is an amorphous, if not entirely
subjective, concept.” 43 Why would he leave open the possibility
that Roberts and its progeny are still constitutionally
appropriate, even to statements not at the core of
Confrontation Clause concerns? Again the cynical answer is to
obtain a majority, but realistically, Roberts provides a cost-free
pro forma stamp of approval for all firmly rooted hearsay of
unavailable declarants. 44 Only Wright provides any relief to
defendants by subjecting nontraditional exceptions to a review
for indicia of reliability. 45 Yet, the Crawford majority opinion
made no reference to Wright. It is unlikely that Justice Scalia
forgot about the case, since Chief Justice Rehnquist suggested
that a simple reference to Wright could have explained the

41

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56-57 n.7 (2004).
Id. at 68.
43
Id. at 63.
44
See, e.g., State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 484-85 (Neb. 2005), petition
for cert. filed, No. 05-5981 (U.S. Aug. 19, 2005).
45
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 817-18 (1990).
42
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reversal in Crawford without any need for restructuring the
Confrontation Clause analysis. 46
There is a more nuanced possibility for the absence of
Wright in the majority opinion. The only holding questioned by
Crawford was White v. Illinois, 47 in which some of the admitted
hearsay included a child’s statement to an officer. 48 In other
words, none of the other cases reached an incorrect result, even
though their reliance on Roberts’ framework was wrong.
Therefore, because Wright was not specifically overruled, its
holding, reversing a conviction where a child’s statements to a
doctor were admitted at trial, 49 is still good law. Since the
statements were made to a private individual, the only
rationale for supporting reversal appears to be that
nontraditional hearsay is subject to a check for reliability.
However, if Wright is recharacterized as testimonial due to the
police selecting the physician, the basis for its holding that
nontraditional hearsay must be subject to a separate reliability
review could be rejected, like the Roberts rationale, without
having to overrule the case. This recharacterization would
accord with the position taken by the Solicitor General’s
previously referenced amicus brief in White. 50 While such an
approach would expand the range of testimonial statements,
particularly in child hearsay cases, it would also eliminate the
argument that Supreme Court precedent requires a Sixth
Amendment review of nontestimonial hearsay.
While I agree with Crawford’s recognition that
confrontation is primarily a procedural right, 51 and
acknowledge that reliability tends to be more a due process
concern, it is imperative to retain a reliability review given a
testimonial approach. First, there is a vast difference between
trial practice in 1791 compared to today. Common law judges
distrusted jurors and restricted access to evidence. They had

46

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 76 (Rehnquist, C. J., concurring).
502 U.S. 346 (1992).
48
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.
49
Wright, 497 U.S. at 827 (“Given the presumption of inadmissibility
accorded accusatory hearsay statements not admitted pursuant to a firmly rooted
hearsay exception, we agree with the court below that the State has failed to show that
the younger daughter’s incriminating statements to the pediatrician possessed
sufficient ‘particularized guarantees of trustworthiness’ under the Confrontation
Clause to overcome that presumption.” (internal citations omitted)).
50
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 18,
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992) (No. 90-6113)).
51
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
47
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stricter competency rules, and fewer hearsay exceptions. 52
Early Supreme Court cases recognized how the fear of perjury
impacted trial practice. For example, Benson v. United States
posited that “the theory of the common law was to admit to the
witness stand only those presumably honest, appreciating the
sanctity of an oath, unaffected as a party by the result, and free
from any of the temptations of interest. The courts were afraid
to trust the intelligence of jurors.” 53
Post-Crawford, it has been noted that Roberts and its
progeny “seem to be alive and well as to nontestimonial
hearsay.” 54 As previously mentioned, to the extent that the
hearsay is introduced pursuant to a firmly rooted exception,
the result is an automatic pass, so there is no incentive to
reject the test. Even when Wright applies, reversals are not
assured. 55 But assuming that reliability is required, are courts
bound by the White/Wright definition, or can Crawford’s
extended dalliance with history be used to support a reliability
check with some bite? For years, I have contended that
nontraditional uses of firmly rooted hearsay exceptions must be
analyzed under Wright not White. 56 This would result in
nontraditional hearsay being subject to a reliability check,
regardless of which exception allowed for its admission.
Certainly the reference to White in Crawford implies that for
confrontation purposes, flexible interpretations of excited
utterances do not satisfy the exception as understood in 1791. 57
Therefore, any argument that a true excited utterance is
52
See, e.g., id. at 56; Miles v. United States, 103 U.S. 304, 310 (1880); Queen
v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. 290, 295-96 (1813).
53
Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 336 (1892).
54
Davis v. State, No. 03-04-00014-CR, 2005 WL 1173964, at *6 (Tex. App.
May 19, 2005). See, e.g., United States v. Hendricks, 395 F.3d 173, 182 (3d Cir. 2005);
United States v. Holmes, 406 F.3d 337, 348 (5th Cir. 2005); Horton v. Allen, 370 F.3d
75, 85 (1st Cir. 2004); Evans v. Luebbers, 371 F.3d 438, 444-45 (8th Cir. 2004); United
States v. McClain, 377 F.3d 219, 221 n.1 (2d Cir. 2004); State v. Rivera, 844 A.2d 191,
200-01 (Conn. 2004); Demons v. State, 595 S.E.2d 76, 80 (Ga. 2004); State v. Vaught,
682 N.W.2d 284, 292 (Neb. 2004).
55
Compare People v. Garrison, 109 P.3d 1009, 1013 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (no
reversal for statement admitted under residual exception), with Miller v. State, 98 P.3d
738, 745 (Okla. Crim. App. 2004) (reversal where declaration against interest to friend
was admitted).
56
See Myrna S. Raeder, The Effect of the Catch-alls on Criminal Defendants:
Little Red Riding Hood Meets the Hearsay Wolf and Is Devoured, 25 LOY. L.A. REV. 925,
941-42 (1992); Myrna S. Raeder, Hot Topics in Confrontation Clause Cases and
Creating a More Workable Confrontation Clause Framework Without Starting Over, 21
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1013, 1014 (2003); Myrna S. Raeder, White’s Effect on the Right to
Confront One’s Accuser, 7 CRIM. JUST. 2, 56 (1993).
57
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004).
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nontestimonial, even when made to the police, would not save a
modern excited utterance.
If the concerns underlying Wright still resonate with the
Court, several possible reliability approaches spring to mind:
(1) retain Wright as is; (2) retain Wright, but permit
corroboration; or (3) adopt a modified historic approach that
would permit testimonial hearsay to the extent it would have
met a hearsay exception in 1791. The approach that would
cause the least dislocation is to retain Wright as is. Since
Crawford encourages experimentation by states to create more
exceptions so long as the declarant testifies or the statement is
nontestimonial, 58 the Court might hesitate jettisoning Wright.
In other words, without any requirement of trustworthiness, a
strict prosecutorial restraint view of Crawford is more likely to
result in trials that include substantial amounts of potentially
unreliable nontestimonial evidence, whether offered under ad
hoc hearsay exceptions or expansively interpreted traditional
exceptions.
However, Wright has been thoroughly criticized for
excluding corroboration from the confrontation mix, since
corroboration appears to support reliability, and as a practical
matter, harmless error analysis will encompass such evidence.
Because Crawford tells us that nontestimonial hearsay does
not concern core confrontation values, slightly modifying the
existing test would not require historic justification. Moreover,
the rejection of corroboration in Wright appeared based on
hearsay analysis. 59 Now that confrontation has been decoupled
from hearsay, the rationale to reject corroboration is lessened.
Alternatively, because the reliability check is really based on
due process rather than confrontation grounds, corroboration
should not be excluded. However, this latter justification
would require the Court to provide an explanation of what due
process means in the trial process, a topic it has approached
somewhat inconsistently on a case by case basis in the context
of a defendant’s right to present a defense. 60

58

See id. at 56, n.7 (noting that testimonial hearsay could not be saved by a
broad, modern hearsay exception, even if that exception might be justifiable in
nontestimonial circumstances).
59
Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805, 806 (1990).
60
Compare Montana v. Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 38 (1996) (plurality approach
to due process), with Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973) (due process
includes “[t]he rights to confront and cross-examine witnesses and to call witnesses in
one’s own behalf”). See also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 315-17 (1998).
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I am hopeful that Crawford’s progeny may permit more
flexibility in interpretation than its originalism suggests,
because it is unclear whether all of the justices in the Crawford
majority fully considered the potential consequences of a
testimonial approach for trial practice; particularly, the
decreased ability to obtain convictions where neither the state
nor the defendant has engaged in any misconduct resulting in
the unavailability of the declarant. The more pragmatic
justices might balk at a broad interpretation of testimonial that
would result in an absolute rule that such evidence would be
excluded whenever the declarant is unavailable, but they
might equally look askance at providing an automatic pass for
all other hearsay. Such views could presage a very narrow
reading of testimonial, but might also suggest a compromise
that retreats from an absolutist version of the confrontation
right to one that also permits otherwise testimonial hearsay
that was available in 1791.
For example, Justice Scalia indicates that excited
utterances were interpreted very narrowly as applying to res
gestae, not after the fact descriptions. 61 The other few existing
exceptions would have also been confined to the type of
information that justified the theoretical underpinning for the
rule, uncorrupted by the modern shift toward liberal admission
of hearsay. Permitting such hearsay, regardless of crossexamination, might actually encourage states to narrowly
interpret their hearsay exceptions, requiring nontraditional
hearsay to be admitted by exceptions that often require
trustworthiness, even if the Court does not ultimately retain a
reliability check for nontestimonial hearsay. For example,
State v. Branch 62 recently narrowly construed excited
utterances to exclude a statement by a child in response to a
question by police. Branch noted, “our analysis is informed by
the principles undergirding the Confrontation Clause
jurisprudence of our federal and state constitutions.” 63 While it
may be naïve to believe that the pendulum is finally swinging
back to less hearsay after decades favoring liberal admission of
out of court statements, Branch may presage a rethinking
about hearsay analysis, not simply confrontation. 64
61

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8.
865 A.2d 673, 688-90 (N.J. 2005).
63
Id. at 690.
64
See also United States v. Arnold, 410 F.3d 895, 901 (6th Cir. 2005) (not an
excited utterance where no proof of the amount of time between the incident and the
62
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Another wild card that is just beginning to surface is the
role of state constitutions in regulating nontestimonial
hearsay. Whether or not reliability is required under the
federal constitution, a state can always provide more protection
for criminal defendants under its own constitution, and in a
post-Crawford world, this need not be linked to a pro forma
pass for firmly rooted hearsay.
III.

DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES

A.

The Empirical Evidence Concerning Domestic Violence

While the aggressive prosecution of batterers has
undoubtedly played a significant role in nearly halving
nonfatal intimate violence against women between 1993 and
2001, 65 the numbers are still distressing, and some of the
decline in aggravated assaults may be illusory. 66 Intimate
partner violence comprised 20% of violent crime against women
in 2001, 67 and family violence accounted for about 1 in 10 of all
violent victimizations from 1993-2002. 68 In 1993, women were
victimized in approximately 1.1 million non-fatal violent
crimes. 69 By 2001, this figure declined to 588,490 incidents. 70
Simple assault comprised nearly 72% of the total. 71 The
number of women killed yearly by their intimates fell less
dramatically during that timeframe to 1247 from 1581. 72 An
analysis of 2002 homicide data found that for female victims
911 call, and noting that use of the exceptions must be closely scrutinized to protect the
defendant’s right to confront accusers); People v. Victors, 819 N.E.2d 311, 319 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2004) (not an excited utterance where a five minute discussion with backup officer
took place before statement was made).
65
See CALLIE MARIE RENNISON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE, 1993-2001, at 2 (NCJ 197838) (2003), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/pub/pdf/ipv01.pdf.
66
See, e.g., Jill Leovy, LAPD Gave Misleading Crime Data, L.A. TIMES, Aug.
30, 2005, at B1 (correcting previous error consolidating all domestic assaults,
regardless of whether aggravated or simple, substantially overstated decline in violent
crime).
67
RENNISON, supra note 65, at 1.
68
MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., FAMILY VIOLENCE
STATISTICS INCLUDING STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES 1 (NCJ 207846)
(June 2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/fvs.pdf. It should be
noted that family violence is a broader term than domestic violence and includes all
types of violent crime committed by an offender who is related to the victim either
biologically or legally, through marriage or adoption.
69
RENNISON, supra note 65, at 1.
70
Id.
71
See id. at Table 1.
72
Id. at 2.
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who knew their killers, 61% were wives or intimate
acquaintances of their killers. 73
Statistics from other sources are even higher, indicating
that approximately one in five women is victimized
repeatedly. 74 While the extent of battering during pregnancy is
not clear, homicide is the second leading cause of death in
pregnant women. 75 According to the 2000 National Violence
Against Women Survey, 25% of women and 8% of men are
subject to violence by an intimate during their lifetime. 76 That
survey estimated that approximately 1.5 million women are
battered or raped annually by their partners, 77 and about 1/3 of
these women are injured enough to require medical
treatment. 78 Twenty percent of women, moreover, who need
treatment are pregnant at the time. 79 Finally, a large amount
of intimate partner victimizations are not reported to the
police. 80 Some claim that as much of 50% of domestic violence
goes unreported. 81
B.

The Criminalization of Domestic Violence

Coinciding with the emergence of feminism, the
Battered Women’s Movement became prominent in the 1970s
and by the 1990s resulted in significant statutory and policy
changes to ensure the prosecution of domestic violence crimes,
provide shelters for battered women and their children, and
modify self-defense definitions to include women who kill their
73
VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF
2002 HOMICIDE DATA 7 (2004), available at http://www.vpc.org/studies/wmmw2004.pdf.
74
See, e.g., Tri-Town Council on Youth and Family Services,
http://tritowncouncil.org/DOMESTICVIOLENCE.html (last visited Aug. 17, 2005).
75
Jeani Chang et al., Homicide: A Leading Cause of Injury Deaths Among
Pregnant and Postpartum Women in the United States, 1991-1999, 95 AM. J. PUB.
HEALTH 471 (2005), abstract at http://www.ajph.org/cgi/content/abstaract/95/3/471.
76
PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT’L INST. OF JUST. AND THE
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE,
INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 26 (NCJ 183781)
(2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf.
77
Id.
78
Id. at v.
79
Aili Mari Tripp & Ladan Affi, Domestic Violence in a Cultural Context, 27
FAM. ADVOC. 32, 33 (Fall 2004).
80
PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXTENT,
NATURE AND CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE
NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 49 (NCJ 181867) (2000).
81
CALLIE MARIE RENNISON & SARAH WELCHANS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
1
(NCJ
178247)
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ipv.pdf.
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batterers. 82 Previously, domestic violence calls often resulted
in few arrests and prosecutions as well as low conviction rates.
In addition, the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) 83 was
passed, and since 1995, its office within the Department of
Justice has provided more than $1 billion in grants “to train
personnel, establish specialized domestic violence and sexual
assault units, assist victims of violence, and hold perpetrators
accountable.” 84 Funding for studies and programs aimed at
reducing domestic violence has also been provided.
Newly adopted police, prosecutorial and judicial
practices dramatically transformed domestic violence litigation
during the last twenty years. 85 Warrantless misdemeanor
arrests are now the rule. Pro arrest or mandatory arrest
policies are common, as are no-drop prosecutions, regardless of
any contrary wishes of complainants. Protective orders are
routinely, though not invariably, enforced by criminal
contempt. 86 In some urban jurisdictions, domestic violence
courts exist, a number of which consolidate all related cases
regardless of whether brought in civil, criminal or in juvenile
court. 87 Similarly, in some urban settings, prosecutorial offices
have made domestic violence a priority, assigning prosecutors
and advocates to domestic violence units. 88 Typically, courts
and prosecutorial offices specializing in domestic violence have

82
See generally Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 16; Raeder,
Simpson and Beyond, supra note 15.
83
Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1902
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 8, 18 and 42 U.S.C. (1994)).
84
Office on Violence Against Women, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/vawo/
about.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2005).
85
See generally Phyllis Goldfarb, Intimacy and Injury: Legal Interventions for
Battered Women, in THE HANDBOOK OF WOMEN, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE LAW (Andrea
Barnes ed., 2005).
86
Horror stories can still occur. See, e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales,
125 S.Ct. 2796 (2005) (husband murdered his three children after police repeatedly
failed to respond to estranged wife’s complaints that he had violated a protective order;
Court found no basis for civil rights liability).
87
See, e.g., Judge Lowell D. Castleton et al., Ada County Family Violence
Court: Shaping the Means to Better the Result, 39 FAM. L.Q. 27 (Spring 2005); see
generally EMILY SACK, FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, CREATING A DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE COURT: GUIDELINES AND BEST PRACTICES (2002), available at
http://endabuse.org/programs/healthcare/files/FinalCourt_Guidelines.pdf;
Jennifer
Thompson, Comment, Who’s Afraid of Judicial Activism? Reconceptualizing a
Traditional Paradigm in the Context of Specialized Domestic Violence Court Programs,
56 ME. L. REV. 407 (2004).
88
See generally Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle
for the Future of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1673 (2004).

328

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

produced higher conviction rates in comparison to jurisdictions
where domestic violence is treated like any other assault. 89
It became obvious relatively quickly in the fight against
domestic violence that the major impediment to obtaining
convictions was that the majority of battered women did not
want to testify. Even when they appeared at trial, they often
recanted their accusations and generally were bad witnesses,
resulting in relatively few convictions. 90 As a result, aided by
the Roberts approach to confrontation, prosecutors developed
what is known somewhat misleadingly as “evidence based” or
“victimless” prosecutions. 91 In other words, hearsay exceptions
for excited utterances, medical statements, or ad hoc exceptions
for trustworthy hearsay permitted prosecution in the absence
of the victim through the testimony of police and medical
personnel. Sometimes statements made in application for
protective orders would be introduced, not simply the order
itself. 92 Cases relied on these second-hand witnesses, and also
included photographs of injuries, medical testimony, and in
some jurisdictions expansive use of prior acts of domestic
violence offered under Rule 404(b) or domestic violence
exceptions. On occasion, a Battered Woman Syndrome (BWS)
expert would explain why the woman stayed with her batterer
or had recanted her accusatory statements, thereby
rehabilitating the credibility of the victim who had testified or
whose hearsay had been impeached by her prior inconsistent
statements.
In retrospect, this effort to hold batterers accountable
for their actions did not create uniformly good results for
battered women. In some instances, women have virtually
been forced to testify or face jail under material witness or
bench warrants when they ignore subpoenas, 93 and both the
89

See id. at 1673-74.
See, e.g., JOANNE BELKNAP & DEE L.R. GRAHAM, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
FACTORS RELATED TO DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT DISPOSITIONS IN A LARGE URBAN
AREA 11 (NCJ 202564), in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: SUMMARIES FOR JUSTICE
PROFESSIONALS (Barbara E. Smith ed., Dec. 2003), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/202564.pdf; Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 16, at 768-69.
91
See generally Andrew King-Ries, Crawford v. Washington: The End of
Victimless Prosecution?, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 301 (2005).
92
See People v. Thompson, 812 N.E.2d 516, 521 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (holding
that statements made by a domestic violence victim in an order of protection, which
were introduced at trial, were testimonial and violated the Constitution’s
Confrontation Clause).
93
See, e.g., Thomas L. Kirsch II, Problems in Domestic Violence: Should
Victims be Forced to Participate in the Prosecution of Their Abusers?, 7 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 383, 402 (2001).
90
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effect and the effectiveness of such policies began to be
questioned. 94 In other words, the bottom line is that the vast
majority of female domestic violence victims still do not want to
prosecute their batterers.
While batterers were getting
convicted in higher percentages due to the witness-lite/hearsayheavy approach, particularly in jurisdictions with domestic
violence courts, some battered women’s advocates starting
noticing more ominous trends. Besides more women being
arrested for domestic violence and judges granting mutual
protective orders, 95 women were being charged criminally for
endangering their children who witnessed their abuse; and
even when they were not charged, their children might be
removed from the home and placed in foster care. 96 A few
researchers concluded that the empirical evidence indicated
that some classes of women were put at greater risk by
aggressive prosecution, particularly in misdemeanor cases
where defendants were released pretrial, or received probation
or short sentences. 97
94

See, e.g., MARY A. FINN, EFFECTS OF VICTIMS’ EXPERIENCES WITH
PROSECUTORS ON VICTIM EMPOWERMENT AND RE-OCCURRENCE OF INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE (NCJ 202983) (Feb. 2004), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/grants/202983.pdf; see also NAT’L DIST. ATTORNEYS ASS’N, POLICY POSITIONS ON
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 9 (adopted Oct. 23, 2004) (recommending discretionary policies,
rather than written no drop policies), available at http://www.ndaa.org/newsroom/
index.html.
95
See, e.g., Sandy Chestnut, The Practice of Dual Arrests in Domestic
Violence Situations: Does It Accomplish Anything?, 70 MISS. L.J. 971 (2001); Leigh
Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the Efficacy of
Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 23-24 (2004);
Andrea D. Lyon , Comment, Be Careful What You Wish For: An Examination of Arrest
and Prosecution Patterns of Domestic Violence Cases in Two Cities in Michigan, 5
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 253 (1999); Sack, supra note 88.
96
See, e.g., Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 844 (N.Y. 2004)
(clarifying that neglect is not established solely when a child has witnessed her
mother’s domestic abuse and therefore routine filing of neglect on this ground was
unjustified). See also Justine A. Dunlap, Sometimes I Feel Like a Motherless Child:
The Error of Pursuing Battered Mothers for Failure to Protect, 50 LOY. L. REV. 565
(2004); FAMILY VIOLENCE PREVENTION FUND, IDENTIFYING AND RESPONDING TO
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: CONSENSUS RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHILD AND ADOLESCENT
HEALTH (updated August 2004), available at http://endabuse.org/programs/healthcare/
files/Pediatric.pdf; Beth A. Mandel, The White Fist of the Child Welfare System:
Racism, Patriarchy, and the Presumptive Removal of Children from Victims of
Domestic Violence in Nicholson v. Williams, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1131 (2005); Joan S.
Meier, Domestic Violence, Child Custody, and Child Protection: Understanding
Judicial Resistance and Imagining the Solutions, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
657, 667 (2003).
97
See Lawrence W. Sherman, The Influence of Criminology on Criminal Law:
Evaluating Arrests for Misdemeanor Domestic Violence, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1 (1992). See also Deborah Epstein et al., Transforming Aggressive Prosecution
Policies: Prioritizing Long-Term Safety in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence Cases,
11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 465, 467 n.3-4 (2003); Deborah Epstein,
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Moreover, large percentages of women continued to live
with their batterers. While I believe the get-tough domestic
violence policies contributed to the overall decrease in domestic
homicides and decreasing incidents of domestic violence, the
one-size-fits-all approach clearly disadvantaged some women,
disempowered others and did not uniformly lead to lesser risks
of violence.
C.

Post-Crawford Realities in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions

Crawford brought trials without complainants to an
abrupt halt.
Generally, prosecutors estimate that
approximately 80% of victims are uncooperative. 98 Thus, in
Crawford’s wake, some localities were reportedly dropping 50%
of domestic violence cases. 99 Indeed, a recent survey of
prosecutors in several jurisdictions by Professor Lininger
disclosed significant difficulties in prosecuting domestic
violence cases after Crawford. 100 Unsurprisingly, a number of
domestic violence cases were reversed because testimonial
hearsay had been introduced. 101 However, an even more
dramatic impact is the anecdotal view that many domestic
violence cases are no longer being prosecuted because of their
perceived difficulty to win after Crawford. 102
We are unlikely to see a return of pure “evidence based”
trials. Despite the hopes of some, we cannot ignore the
elephant in the room. While not every statement of an absent
domestic violence victim will be excluded, enough will be to
Procedural Justice: Tempering the State’s Response to Domestic Violence, 43 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1843 (2002) (discussing batterers). Cf. Laura Dugan et al., Exposure
Reduction or Retailiation? The Effects of Domestic Violence Resources on IntimatePartner Homicide, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 169, 191-92 (2003) (finding aggressive
prosecutorial policies lead to fewer deaths, except that deaths of white females increase
when policies state a willingness to prosecute violators of protective orders).
98
See Lininger, Evidentiary Issues, supra note 16 (cited by the Court of
Appeals decisions in Stancil v. United States, 866 A.2d 799, 807 (D.C. 2005), vacated by
In re Stancil, 878 A.2d 1186 (D.C. 2005) (en banc), and Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960,
965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated by 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005)).
99
Robert Tharp, Domestic Violence Cases Face New Test: Ruling that
Suspects Can Confront Accusers Scares Some Victims from Court, DALLAS MORNING
NEWS, July 5, 2004, at 1A.
100
See generally Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 16, at 750.
101
See, e.g., State v. Livanavage, No. LC2003-000903-001 DT, 2005 WL
947879, at *3 (Ariz. Super. Jan. 24, 2005); Stancil, 866 A.2d at 813.
102
Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 16, at 750; Chris Hutton, Sir
Walter Raleigh Revived: The Supreme Court Re-vamps Two Decades of Confrontation
Clause Precedent in Crawford v. Washington, 50 S.D. L. REV. 41, 66 (2005).
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require a reassessment of current practices. In retrospect, such
an examination may prove beneficial to the integrity of the
criminal justice system as well as to defendants, and also
provides an opportunity to revisit the issues that are important
to battered women. For example, one could critique preCrawford prosecutors as taking the easy way out and
denigrating the role that cross-examination of live witnesses
plays in the criminal justice system. Why bother dealing with
difficult witnesses whose credibility might be questioned when
hearsay and secondary evidence wins cases that might be lost if
the complainant actually testified? Yet, the absence of key
witnesses is in conflict with the precept that confrontation
“contributes to the establishment of a system of criminal justice
in which the perception as well as the reality of fairness
prevails.” 103 We do not want to foster the perception that
domestic violence cases provide second hand justice by second
hand witnesses.
Moreover, domestic violence trials with absent
complainants were viewed by some as producing problematic
results for families. Court appearances, jail time, and a
conviction might interfere with the batterer’s employment and
housing opportunities, lessening his crucial role in providing
financial sustenance to the family, without necessarily
lowering the likelihood that the batterer would reoffend. The
goal was not to see the batterer punished, but to stop the
violence and, where feasible, to maintain family unity. In
contrast, for some women’s advocates, the focus on family unity
was seen as part of the problem, not the solution. 104
In any event, post-Crawford, more effort will be
necessary to obtain victim cooperation. Failing cooperation,
prosecutors will have to assign more resources to obtaining
other witnesses or sources of admissible evidence.
For
example, jailhouse conversations may contain admissions of
the defendant or be useful under a forfeiture theory if the
victim refuses to testify. A few post-Crawford cases also
appear to carefully scrutinize proffers of unavailability
required by hearsay exceptions when the prosecutor attempts

103
Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019 (1988) (quoting Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S.
530, 540 (1986)).
104
See, e.g., Brenda V. Smith, Battering, Forgiveness, and Redemption, 11 AM.
U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 921, 946 (2003) (noting that clergy would often counsel
women to return to their batterers in order to preserve family unity).
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to introduce nontestimonial hearsay. 105 Thus, close enough for
government work may not be good enough to demonstrate a
good faith attempt to produce the declarant.
IV.

EXCITED UTTERANCES—THE WORKHORSE OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASES

A.

Categorical Exclusion Versus Case-by-Case Analysis

A large percentage of the hearsay admitted in domestic
violence cases is offered as excited utterances of absent
complainants. Many of these statements are made to law
enforcement either via 911 calls, in person as volunteered
statements to officers arriving at the scene, or as a result of
questioning, either at the scene or later. Because bright line
rules make a judge’s work easier and the law more predictable,
one immediate response to Crawford has been to view excited
utterances categorically. 106 This appears to assume they would
all be nontestimonial, though in the case of 911 calls, one might
argue the opposite result is more appropriate. Either way, the
difficulty with the categorical approach is how to define the
categories. A host of possibilities exist, including:
1. All excited utterances volunteered to officers
who were on routine patrol.
2. All excited utterances made in response to
officers securing a crime scene.
3. All excited utterances
preliminary investigation.

made

during

a

4. All excited utterances made via 911 calls
while a crime is in progress.
5. All excited utterances not made at the station
or otherwise formalized by audio or videotape.
6. All excited utterances that would meet the
narrow definition of what was permitted in 1791:
res gestae, not a narrative of a past occurrence.

105
See, e.g., People v. Cloud, No. D042386, 2004 WL 1895022 (Cal. Ct. App.
Aug. 25, 2004).
106
See, e.g., People v. Moscat, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
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7. Res gestae only to officers arriving at a crime
scene.
8. All excited utterances as determined by state
law.
As Professor Mosteller suggests, indicating the range of
possibilities demonstrates the unhelpfulness of this approach
given the myriad of factual settings. 107 The argument favoring
automatic
categorization
of
excited
utterances
as
nontestimonial considers it inherently contradictory to view
excited utterances as testimonial. The Indiana Court of
Appeals explained this point in Hammon: 108
[T]he very concept of an ‘excited utterance’ is such that it is difficult
to perceive how such a statement could ever be ‘testimonial.’ ‘The
underlying rationale of the excited utterance exception is that such a
declaration from one who has recently suffered an overpowering
experience is likely to be truthful.’ To be admissible, an exited
utterance ‘must be unrehearsed and made while still under the
stress of excitement from the startling event.’ ‘The heart of the
inquiry is whether the declarants had the time for reflection and
deliberation.’ An unrehearsed statement made without time for
reflection or deliberation, as required to be an ‘excited utterance,’ is
not ‘testimonial’ in that such a statement, by definition, has not been
made in contemplation of its use in a future trial. 109

Categorical exclusion of excited utterances was first
suggested in People v. Moscat, 110 an early post-Crawford 911
case that has become influential, despite later criticism that
the decision played fast and loose with the facts in the case. 111
A number of post-Crawford cases treat exited utterances
categorically. 112 While this approach has simplicity in its favor,
107
See Mosteller, supra note 14, at 567-68 (providing examples and discussion
of police questioning practices, indicating that a model based structured questioning is
not serviceable).
108
Hammon v. State, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
109
See id. at 952-53 (internal citations omitted). The Indiana Supreme Court
rejected this all or nothing approach, and vacated the opinion in Hammon v. State, 829
N.E.2d 444, 453 (Ind. 2005).
110
777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 879-80 (Crim. Ct. 2004) (911 call is part of the criminal
incident itself and qualifies as an excited utterance because the caller had no
opportunity to reflect and falsify account of events). See also People v. Corella, 18
Cal.Rptr.3d 770, 776-77 (Ct. App. 2004).
111
Sabrina Tavernise, Legal Precedent Doesn’t Let Facts Stand in the Way,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 2004, at A1.
112
See, e.g., Anderson v. State 111 P.3d 350, 354-55 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005);
State v. Anderson, No. E2004-00694-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 171441, at *4 (Tenn. Crim.
App. Jan. 27, 2005) (juveniles flagged down officer; “Because an excited utterance is a
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it ignores the fact that many modern excited utterances are
broader than excited utterances of yore. It also ignores the
context in which the statement was made, which seems
antithetical to Crawford.
A growing number of courts now appear to agree that
excited utterances cannot be excluded automatically from
For example, the court in
confrontation review. 113
Commonwealth v. Gray 114 relied on the rationale first raised by
Lopez v. State 115 to hold that a statement does not lose its
character as testimonial merely because the declarant was
excited at the time it was made. Lopez recognized that while
excited utterances are likely to be reliable, “under Crawford,
reliability has no bearing on whether a statement was
testimonial. Some testimonial statements are reliable and
others are not.” 116
Lopez explained its reasoning as follows:
a startled person who identifies a suspect in a statement made to a
police officer at the scene of a crime surely knows that the statement
is a form of accusation that will be used against the suspect. In this
situation, the statement does not lose its character as a testimonial
statement merely because the declarant was excited at the time it
was made. 117

Similarly, the Court of Appeals in Stancil v. United
refused to “automatically” exclude all excited
States
utterances from the class of testimonial statements following
the rationale in Lopez.
118

reactionary event of the senses made without reflection or deliberation, it cannot be
testimonial in that such a statement has not been made in contemplation of its use in a
future trial.”); People v. Spade, No. A105918, 2005 WL 240867, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan.
28, 2005) (“In our view, Crawford is inapplicable to this case because spontaneous
statements made to a responding officer are not ‘testimonial’ in nature.”); State v.
Cannaday, No. 04AP-109, 2005 WL 736583, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2005)
(expanding this view even further in finding that Crawford does not apply to “commonlaw exceptions to the hearsay rule, such as excited utterances.”); see also discussion of
conflicting case law on this issue in Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 453.
113
See, e.g., Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 453; State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802,
811 (Minn. 2005); State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 482 (Neb. 2005) (some excited
utterances are testimonial, others are not), petition for cert. filed, No. 05-5981 (Aug. 19,
2005); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 846 (Wash. 2005) (911 cases should be assessed on
a case-by-case basis); Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 575-77 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2005); State v. Parks, 116 P.3d 631, 638-39 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
114
867 A.2d 560 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004).
115
888 So. 2d 693 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
116
Id. at 699.
117
Id. at 699-700.
118
866 A.2d 799, 809 (D.C. Ct. App. 2005), vacated by In re Stancil, 878 A.2d
1186 (D.C. 2005) (en banc).
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The case-by-case analysis appears to be more doctrinally
sound than automatic exclusion, particularly since excited
utterances were extremely limited in 1791, unlike today, as
Justice Scalia mentioned, when questioning whether White’s
holding was sound. 119 In White, the statement made by the
child to the police officer occurred after the incident, and after
disclosures to the babysitter and the mother. 120 Thus, Justice
Scalia implicitly relied on a case-by-case approach in his
discussion. Moreover, in Siler v. Ohio, 121 the Supreme Court
vacated a conviction resting on the admission of an excited
utterance by a child, and remanded for further consideration in
light of Crawford, a result that belies the notion that a
categorical exclusion for excited utterances is inherent in the
Crawford analysis.
Applying Crawford on a case-by-case basis to determine
the definition of testimonial has been described as a “grueling
job.” 122 Ironically, the case-by-case approach does not assure
how the court will rule in an individual case, because in light of
the expansion of the excited utterance exception, its
testimonial nature depends on the circumstances in which the
particular statement was made. Indeed, when such statements
are made in person by declarants to police officers, they should
be scrutinized carefully to determine if and when the
statements morph from volunteered cries for help to products
of police interrogation.
Moreover, Crawford’s case specific analysis appears to
ensure that the Fifth and Sixth Amendment definition of what
is testimonial will diverge. Crawford provides a reference to
Rhode Island v. Innis 123 for the proposition that interrogation is
intended in its colloquial sense. 124 In this context, such a
reference should be interpreted to mean that custodial
interrogation a la Miranda v. Arizona 125 is not required. Such a
distinction is important since most of the police questioning
related to excited utterances in domestic violence cases is
neither aimed at suspects, nor custodial. For example, in

119

Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 58 n.8 (2004).
White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 349-50 (1992).
121
125 S. Ct. 671 (2004).
122
Davis v. State, No. 03-04-00014-CR, 2005 WL 1173964, at *4 (Tex. Crim.
App. May 19, 2005).
123
446 U.S. 291 (1980).
124
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53 n.4.
125
384 U.S. 436, 466 (1966).
120
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People v. Dennison, 126 a pre-Crawford case, the Colorado
Supreme Court held that “an on-the-scene investigation, or
questioning which enables an officer to determine what has
happened and who has been injured, is not an interrogation
under Miranda or its progeny.” 127 If custodial questioning is
required, none of these statements would be testimonial, unless
the Court adopted a broader definition that treated traditional
custodial interrogation as only one way of producing an
extrajudicial statement given to the police.
Some prosecutors are already arguing that custodial
questioning is a prerequisite for testimonial statements.
Limiting the confrontation right to custodial interrogation
would provide little protection to core Confrontation Clause
concerns. Miranda is of relatively recent vintage, and while
constitutionally based, 128 it cannot dictate the contours of a
right based on different values. Miranda provides a bright line
rule for law enforcement practices, while Crawford is a trial
right enforced by lawyers and judges. Some courts have
recognized that the terms “interrogation” and “testimonial”
may be quite different for Confrontation Clause purposes postCrawford, than when used in other contexts. 129
B.

Lack of Formality Does Not Preclude an Excited
Utterance from Being Testimonial

Lack of formality is sometimes mentioned as a separate
reason for treating excited utterances as not being testimonial.
Under this rationale, Crawford only applies to police
interrogations made as part of “a relatively formal
investigation where a trial is contemplated.” 130 Thus, where
the victim had just been shot, and the police were trying to
learn the circumstances of the shooting, the statements were
admitted, because “[n]o suspect was under arrest, and the
police had not yet determined whether a crime had been
committed. The interviews with Shufford [the victim] were not
recorded, and there was no ‘structured police questioning.’” 131

126

918 P.2d 1114 (Colo. 1996).
Id. at 1116.
128
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 432 (2000).
129
See, e.g., State v. Hembertt, 696 N.W.2d 473, 481-82 (Neb. 2005).
130
People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770, 776 (Ct. App. 2004).
131
People v. Compton, No. B163293, 2005 WL 236841, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App.
Jan. 26, 2005) (quoting Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53 n.4 (2004)).
127
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In contrast, the Court of Appeals in Stancil v. United States
rejected a formality requirement, relying on Crawford’s
discussion that suggested interrogation included any
questioning in a structured environment, meaning that an
excited utterance made to an officer at the scene could be
testimonial. 132
A few courts seem to suggest formality is a requirement,
rather than an indicator, but this would appear foreclosed
under any but the narrowest Crawford definitions.
For
example, People v. Cage 133 found a five-year-old child’s
statement to a police officer at a hospital was not formal and
therefore nontestimonial:
We cannot believe that the framers would have seen a ‘striking
resemblance’ between Deputy Mullin’s interview with John at the
hospital and a justice of the peace’s pretrial examination. There was
no particular formality to the proceedings. Deputy Mullin was still
trying to determine whether a crime had been committed and, if so,
by whom. No suspect was under arrest; no trial was contemplated.
Deputy Mullin did not summon John to a courtroom or a station
house; he sought him out, at a neutral, public place. There was no
‘structured questioning,’ just an open-ended invitation for John to
tell his story. The interview was not recorded. There is no evidence
that Deputy Mullin even so much as recorded it later in a police
report. Police questioning is not necessarily police interrogation.
When people refer to a ‘police interrogation,’ however colloquially,
they have in mind something far more formal and focused. 134

This type of analysis places form over substance. The
absence of a police force was the prime reason that formality
was required to obtain statements in 1791. Thus, it is perfectly
understandable why modern police questioning bears little
resemblance to earlier judicial practice. Crawford tells us that
interrogation is referred to colloquially. Today, one can be
interrogated and can make accusatory statements without any
formality at all.
Thus, while formality may suggest a
statement is testimonial, its absence alone does not render the
statement nontestimonial. Similarly, the extent of questioning
is a legitimate factor, which has led some courts to consider a
statement made in response to minimal questioning as

132
866 A.2d 799, 811-12 (D.C. 2005), vacated by In re Stancil, 878 A.2d 1186
(D.C. 2005) (en banc).
133
15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Ct. App. 2004), review granted and opinion
superseded, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004).
134
Id. at 856-57.
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nontestimonial. 135 However, equating minimal questioning
with an absence of formal interrogation to justify finding a
statement is nontestimonial is inappropriate, since some
statements that lack formality may be intended to bear witness
against the accused by reference to the alternative definitions
of testimonial presented in Crawford.
C.

Appellate Trends Concerning Excited Utterances to
Police Officers

Ironically, Crawford raises the same specter of
unpredictability that Justice Scalia scathingly branded as the
reason why Roberts failed to protect core Confrontation Clause
values. While the decisions take different approaches, People
v. King 136 recently opined that almost all cases have concluded
that initial statements volunteered by excited declarants are
not testimonial. In reaching this result, courts have focused on
the distress of the declarant, the desire to obtain assistance, as
well as the lack of formality and the unstructured nature of the
questioning. Similarly, the Court of Appeals in Stancil rejected
a broad view that any statements to police were testimonial,
saying “it is unlikely that the Court intended the term to
embrace contacts with the police that do not amount to
interrogations.” 137 However, even here complete uniformity
does not exist. 138
Results are more mixed when the focus shifts from the
immediately volunteered statements to all excited statements
in field investigations, in some measure due to the variety of

135

See Anderson v. State, 111 P.3d 350, 354 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005).
People v. King, No. 02CA0201, 2005 WL 170727, at *6 (Colo. Ct. App. Jan.
27, 2005) (holding that a statement is nontestimonial where made to police officer in
“noncustodial setting and without indicia of formality”) (citing cases); see also
Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 565, 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding that
statements were nontestimonial where pregnant victim approached officers and said
she was assaulted and her mother stabbed by mother’s boyfriend); Rogers v. State, 814
N.E.2d 695, 699, 701-02 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (holding statements made to police within
seven minutes of the incident nontestimonial); People v. Bryant, No. 247039, 2004 WL
1882661, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2004) (per curiam) (holding Crawford
inapplicable because police questioning of victim in obvious physical pain was not
interrogation); Wilson v. State, 151 S.W.3d 694, 698 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) (holding
that where declarant approached officers, nervous and about to cry upon seeing her
wrecked car, “any questions posed to her by the police were in the context of answering
her questions and determining why she was upset”).
137
866 A.2d at 811.
138
See, e.g., Lopez v. State, 888 So. 2d 693, 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
136

2005]

REMEMBER THE LADIES AND THE CHILDREN TOO

339

different circumstances that are encompassed by that term. 139
The Court of Appeals in Stancil 140 attempted to chart a middle
course that treats as testimonial “a declarant’s knowing
responses to structured questioning in an investigative
environment or a courtroom setting where the declarant would
reasonably expect that his or her responses might be used in
Thus, police response to
future judicial proceedings.” 141
emergency calls, securing the scene, and preliminary
questioning
to
determine
what
happened,
produce
nontestimonial statements under Stancil, in contrast to
testimonial statements that result from structured questioning
of victims or witnesses to a crime after the emergency has
passed. 142
Other courts have adopted this distinction between
statements made to police officers while they are “securing the
scene” and those taken later. 143 The Stancil court noted that
“once the scene has been secured, and once the officers’
attention has turned to investigation and fact-gathering,
statements made by those on the scene, in response to police
questioning, tend in greater measure to take on a testimonial
character[.]” 144 People v. Victors 145 simply asked whether the
statement by the complainant to the officer was being used to
139

See Davis v. State, No. 03-04-00014-CR, 2005 WL 1173964, at *6-9 (Tex.
Crim. App. May 19, 2005) (discussing conflicting caselaw). Compare Stancil, 866 A.2d
799, Lopez, 888 So. 2d at 694, Moody v. State, 594 S.E.2d 350, 352, 354 n.6 (Ga. 2004)
(holding that interrogation includes the field investigation of witnesses by police
shortly after the commission of a crime in a case where a jealous man kills the woman
with whom he had a sexual relationship), and Pitts v. State, 612 S.E.2d 1, 5 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2005) (holding that statements made to deputies after they arrested defendant at
scene were testimonial), with Davis v. State, No. 2-03-305-CR, 2005 WL 183141, at *3
(Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 2005) (holding statements are not testimonial where wife
voluntarily made 911 call after discovering a body and voluntarily informed police
officer who came to interview her of the statements that her common-law husband
made to her. These statements were neither the product of custodial interrogation nor
responses to “tactically structured police questioning.”); People v. Compton, No.
B163293, 2005 WL 236841, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Jan. 26, 2005) (holding that statements
made to officer at crime scene and hospital are nontestimonial); People v. Mackey, 785
N.Y.S.2d 870, 874 (App. Div. 2004) (holding that preliminary field investigations lack
the requisite formality to constitute a police interrogation).
140
866 A.2d 799 (D.C. 2005).
141
Id. at 812 (citing United States v. Saget, 377 F.3d 223, 228 (2d Cir. 2004)).
142
Id. at 810-12.
143
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gonsalves, 833 N.E.2d 549, 555-56 (Mass.
2005) (“questioning by law enforcement agents, whether police, prosecutors, or others
acting directly on their behalf, other than to secure a volatile scene or to establish the
need for or provide medical care, is interrogation in the colloquial sense.”).
144
Stancil, 866 A.2d at 813.
145
819 N.E.2d 311 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
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prove an element of the offense, in finding it testimonial. 146 The
highest courts in several states are beginning to reach this
issue. 147
Doctrinally, it appears sound to treat statements that
would have met the narrow 1791 definition of excited
utterances as nontestimonial when made to police officers who
come upon the scene or are flagged down by the declarant
while the incident is still in progress, since the combination of
true excitement and need for assistance appears to negate any
testimonial aspect. Thus, I agree that the excited utterance
was nontestimonial in Stancil v. United States, 148 where the
officers arrived to find the defendant’s daughter screaming
with a knife in her hand pointing it at the defendant stating
“stop hurting my mommy, stop hurting my mommy, I’m not
going to let you hurt mommy any more.” 149 She was told to
drop the knife, complied and burst into tears. However,
statements made beyond those heard by the police as they
enter the crime scene should be considered testimonial either
by reference to the reasonable observer approach, or due to the
investigative purpose of the officer. It is fairly disingenuous to
claim that the officer doesn’t know a prosecution is likely to
occur when the jurisdiction has a pro or mandatory arrest
policy in domestic violence cases.
Similarly, Davis v. Texas 150 rhetorically asked “[s]urely,
a reasonable 51-year-old declarant . . . would have known that
her accusations made to a uniformed police officer would be
passed on to prosecutorial authorities to be used against
Thus, Davis identified such statements as
appellant.” 151
serving “either or both of two primary objectives—to gain
immediate official assistance in terminating an exigent
situation and to provide information to aid investigation and

146

Id. at 320 (“[T]estimonial evidence encompasses out-of-court statements
that are offered to establish or disprove an element of the offense charged or a matter
of fact.”).
147
For example, the California Supreme Court has granted review in People
v. Kilday, 20 Cal. Rptr. 3d 161 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), review granted and opinion
superseded, 105 P.3d 114 (Cal. 2005), and in People v. Cage, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846 (Ct.
App. 2004), review granted and opinion superseded, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal. 2004), to address
issues concerning police questioning. See also State v. Wright, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn.
2005).
148
866 A.2d 799.
149
Id. at 802.
150
No. 03-04-00014-CR, 2005 WL 1173964 (Tex. Crim. App. May 19, 2005).
151
Id. at *10.
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possible prosecution arising from the situation.” 152 Davis
recognized the difficulty of drawing a definitive line between
testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay in this context, but
punted, finding harmless error in light of the defendant’s trial
testimony confirming most of the incident. 153
While State v. Wright 154 agreed that a reasonable citizen
interacting with a police officer would likely know any
statement made might be used at trial, the Wright court
rejected this view of testimonial statements as contrary to
Crawford’s intended result and analysis. Instead, Wright
listed eight factors as helpful to analyze field examinations: (1)
whether the declarant was a victim or an observer; (2) the
declarant’s purpose in speaking with the officer (e.g., to obtain
assistance); (3) whether the police or the declarant initiated the
conversation; (4) the location where the statements were made
(e.g., the declarant’s home, a squad car, or the police station);
(5) the declarant’s emotional state when the statements were
made; (6) the level of formality and structure of the
conversation between the officer and declarant; (7) the officers’
purpose in speaking with the declarant (e.g., to secure the
scene, to determine what happened, or to collect evidence); and
(8) if and how the statements were recorded. 155 Ironically, this
analysis supported the Wright court’s finding that a field
statement was not testimonial, even though the defendant was
in custody at the time it was made, and the officers took notes
and evidence while interviewing the victim. This seems
reminiscent of approaches to Roberts, positing factors that
could be used by different courts to reach opposite results.
State v. Mason 156 proposed a simpler test, acknowledging
the importance of deciding whether the statement was made as
part of the incident or part of the prosecution by requiring trial
courts to ascertain (1) whether the declarant initiated the
statement; (2) the formality of the setting; and (3) the
declarant’s purpose in making the statement. 157 Other courts

152
153
154
155
156
157

Id.
Id. at *10-11.
701 N.W.2d 802, 814 (Minn. 2005).
Id. at 812-13.
110 P.3d 245 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 249.
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appear to adopt a totality approach without necessarily
defining fixed factors to be analyzed in every case. 158
Any confrontation approach that requires discerning the
intent of the declarant is likely to prove difficult to administer
or result in the categorical exclusion of excited utterances. For
example, the Indiana Court of Appeals in Fowler concluded
that the classification of a statement as an excited utterance
supports the conclusion that the statement is nontestimonial in
nature because it was made under the stress of the event, not
with intent or knowledge that the statement might later be
used at trial. 159 The Mason 160 court viewed the witness’ purpose
in initiating police contact and making the statement as the
central issue, holding that “statements made while in peril for
the purpose of seeking protection, rather than for the purpose
of bearing witness, are not testimonial.” 161 However, given that
in many states excited utterances are interpreted expansively,
as Stancil indicates, mere excitement does not predict the
declarant’s state of mind.
Moreover, since the declarant will always be absent at
trial, it will be difficult to assess her subjective intent, unless
we have other witnesses or her own statements at a later time.
The court in Gray cites Lopez as indicating that whether a
statement falls within an objective observer category depends
on the purpose for which it is made, not on the emotional state
of the declarant. 162 Some courts appear to conflate a subjective
and objective approach. The court in State v. Hembertt 163
indicated that a declarant who responds to police questioning,
“structured and conducted for the purpose of producing
evidence in anticipation of a potential criminal prosecution,
should reasonably anticipate his or her testimony being used
against the accused.” 164 Similarly, while the Indiana Supreme
Court viewed the motivation of the questioner as more
important than that of the declarant, it noted that “if either is
principally motivated by a desire to preserve the statement it is

158
See Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 454-56 (Ind. 2005) (discussing
different approaches employed to distinguish testimonial and nontestimonial hearsay).
159
Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 964 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated by 829
N.E.2d 459 (Ind. 2005)).
160
See supra note 156 and accompanying text.
161
Mason, 110 P.3d at 249.
162
Commonwealth v. Gray, 867 A.2d 560, 576 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
163
696 N.W.2d 473, 485 (Neb. 2005).
164
Id. at 482 (emphasis added).
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sufficient to render the statement “testimonial.” 165 Thus, the
subjective motivation of the person taking the statement or the
objectively evaluated purpose of the goals of the procedure
being followed by that individual is sufficient. 166 If subjective
intent is viewed from the perspective of an objective declarant
in her circumstances, the context is still important to avoid
finding such statements are nontestimonial, when in fact some
of them may bear witness against the accused. Professor
Méndez has identified a number of obstacles to predicting
declarant’s mental state under either a subjective or objective
approach. 167
D.

Excited Utterances Made in 911 Calls Should Be Viewed
Skeptically

Numerous cases have held that 911 calls are
nontestimonial because they are victim initiated, and the
intention of the citizen is to be rescued. 168 The call is viewed as
part of the incident in progress, providing the declarant with
no time for contemplation. People v. Moscat, 169 probably the
most influential 911 case, characterized such calls as “the
electronically augmented equivalent of a loud cry for help. The
Confrontation Clause was not directed at such a cry.” Fowler v.
State, 170 another early post-Crawford case, noted that Crawford
is limited to police “interrogation,” not all police questioning. 171
The Fowler court concluded that the victim’s 911 statement
was nontestimonial because it was not given in a formal
setting, was not given during any type of pretrial hearing or
deposition, was not contained within a formalized document,
and questioning at the scene did not qualify as a classic police

165

Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 456 (Ind. 2005).
Id.
167
Miguel A. Méndez, Crawford v. Washington: A Critique, 57 STAN. L. REV.
569 (2004); see also Major Robert Wm. Best, To Be or Not To Be Testimonial? That Is
the Question, 2005 APR ARMY LAW. 65, 78-79 (arguing focus on subjective expectation
of a 911 caller is incorrect in determining whether statement is testimonial).
168
See State v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760, 768-72 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (reviewing
several cases involving the testimonial nature of 911 calls); see also King-Ries, supra
note 91 (arguing for broad admission of 911 calls and preliminary statements to the
police).
169
777 N.Y.S.2d 875, 880 (Crim. Ct. 2004).
170
809 N.E.2d 960, 963 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated by, 829 N.E.2d 459 (Ind.
2005) (holding that a victim’s statement was nontestimonial because it lacked “official
and formal quality of such a statement”).
171
Id. at 963.
166

344

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

interrogation. 172 In Pitts v. State, 173 the 911 statements were
viewed as not made for the purpose of establishing or proving a
fact regarding some past event, but for the purpose of
preventing or stopping a crime as it was actually occurring.
The caller there requested that police come to her home to
remove Pitts, who she said had broken into her house. 174
Similarly, State v. Wright 175 held that statements made during
a 911 call were not testimonial because the caller wanted
protection from an immediate danger.
In contrast, People v. Cortes 176 concluded that 911 calls
are testimonial, based on a number of factors: the police
prepare the public to use 911 to report crimes; information is
given on what to report, operators use protocols for obtaining
information, and calls are recorded and preserved. Therefore,
regardless of what the caller believes, the purpose of the
information is for investigation, prosecution and potential use
at a judicial proceeding. 177 The technology even permits the
operator to see the caller’s telephone number if a land line is
used. In Cortes, Judge Bamberger conducted a thorough
historical review to bolster her conclusions. Surprisingly, this
opinion has not received the same degree of attention as
Moscat.
Many 911 decisions do not mention or try to
distinguish Cortes, possibly viewing it based on a unique 911
system or New York state constitutional law. However, the
federal constitutional analysis has general application, and
most of the significant features of 911 systems nationwide are
substantially similar. 178 While Cortes concerned a witness to a
crime, rather than a victim, which makes it more likely the
statement is testimonial, this fact should not result in all 911
calls by victims being nontestimonial. 179
172

The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed on different grounds, holding that
because the declarant’s refusal to continue testifying was not challenged by the
defendant, he forfeited his right to confront her. 829 N.E.2d at 471.
173
612 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005).
174
Id. at 2.
175
686 N.W.2d 295, 302 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 701 N.W.2d 802, 811
(Minn. 2005).
176
781 N.Y.S.2d 401 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
177
Id. at 415.
178
See, e.g., materials at National Emergency Number Association website, at
http://www.nena9-1-1.org/PR_Pubs/Devel_of_911.htm (last visited Sep. 6, 2005).
179
See also State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a call
testimonial where its purpose was to report a crime, but was not a call for help); see
generally Richard Friedman, Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 150 U. PA. L.
REV. 1171, 1242-43 (2002) (distinguishing between two primary objectives in making a
911 call—gaining immediate official assistance and providing information to aid
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Ultimately, the prosecutorial aspects of 911 calls are
such that only the initial cry for help should be considered
nontestimonial. Identification of the perpetrator and any
response to questions beyond what happened should be
considered testimonial. People v. West 180 provides a framework
for analyzing 911 calls, which recognizes that 911 calls must be
parsed, and that some statements may be testimonial while
others are not. West held a rape victim’s “statements made to
the 911 dispatcher concerning the nature of the alleged
attack, . . . medical needs, and her age and location are not
testimonial in nature, and were properly admitted at trial.” 181
These statements, given immediately after her brutal assault
and while she was in shock, were to request medical and police
assistance, to gather information about the situation and to
secure medical attention for her, “not to produce evidence in
anticipation of a potential criminal prosecution.” 182 In contrast,
West held that statements describing her vehicle, the direction
in which her assailants fled, and the items of personal property
they took were testimonial in nature. 183 The difference turned
on the fact that the statements were made in response to
questions posed by the dispatcher for the stated purpose of
involving the police, which implicated the central concerns
underlying the Confrontation Clause.
While not all courts distinguish excited utterances made
in person to police officers from those made in 911 calls, as
Cortes suggests, there are reasons that support interpreting
911 calls narrowly in considering whether they are testimonial.
This includes:
1. The technology is widely publicized as a way
to communicate with police to obtain assistance;
2. All calls are recorded and preserved;
3. The land line phone number and location of
the call is revealed to the operator; and

investigation—and suggesting that this difference be a controlling factor in
determining the admissibility of the statements).
180
823 N.E.2d 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
181
Id. at 91.
182
Id. at 92.
183
Id.
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4. Most 911 protocols dictate questions that go
beyond
ascertaining
an
emergency
and
determining location to serve investigative
purpose.
Similarly, in People v. Dobbin, 184 the court found 911
statements to be testimonial because the caller who had
witnessed a robbery was officially reporting a crime to the
government agency, could objectively expect to be called as a
witness, and was asked a series of over fifteen questions by
“Police Operator 1521.” 185 While the fact that the caller is a
bystander, rather than the victim, makes an even stronger case
for finding statements testimonial, 911 calls by victims should
be considered testimonial as to their accusatory aspects.
Generally, it is a crime to interfere with a 911 call. 186 Even
though this criminalization emphasizes the role the
government plays in creating and preserving this type of
hearsay and the fact that an objective observer would expect
the call to be used prosecutorially, the case that mentioned this
fact did not recognize its potential impact on the testimonial
analysis.
Indeed, the call in question was considered
nontestimonial. 187
Arguably, the very nature of 911 raises the “core”
Confrontation Clause concern of preventing anonymous
accusers in Star Chamber proceedings. For example, the Court
of Appeals’ decision in State v. Wright 188 argued that “there is a
cloak of anonymity surrounding 911 calls that encourages
citizens to make emergency calls and not fear repercussion.” 189
While this fact was used to favor its holding that the call was
nontestimonial, this rationale appears to support the opposite
conclusion.
My view is that the prosecutorial aspects of 911 calls are
such that only the initial cry for help should be considered
nontestimonial. In other words, because 911 calls have a dual
purpose—obtaining help and initiating a criminal investigation
of the crime—the calls must be parsed depending on their
function. Therefore, the identity of the perpetrator or any
184

791 N.Y.S.2d 897, 900 (Sup. Ct. 2004).
Id. at 901-02.
186
See Pitts v. State, 612 S.E.2d 1, 6 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005) (multiple hang-ups in
rapid succession were enough to establish crime).
187
Id.
188
686 N.W.2d 295 (Minn. Ct. App. 2004), aff’d, 701 N.W.2d 802 (Minn. 2005).
189
Id. at 302.
185
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information obtained as a result of questioning by the 911
operator would be viewed as testimonial, while information
about the nature of the injury would not. This type of approach
has been used in other hearsay contexts, most analogously in
declarations against penal interest.
For example, in
190
the Court required each
Williamson v. United States,
statement in a narrative to be viewed separately to determine
whether it was disserving or self-serving. Indeed, in State v.
Davis, 191 the Washington Supreme Court recently cited
Williamson in recognizing that 911 calls may contain both
nontestimonial and testimonial statements. 192 However, Davis
considered the immediate identification of the assailant as
nontestimonial, where this type of information appears
unnecessary to the basic goal of providing assistance.
In summary, doctrinally, a narrow reading of res gestae
volunteered to police officers arriving to secure the scene
supports the admission of such statements as nontestimonial
on an outcry theory. I have more difficulty about how to treat
911 calls, due to their mixed purposes. Not only do they act as
Moscat’s electronically augmented equivalent of a “loud cry for
help,” but the government also uses the 911 system as an
investigative tool and promotes its ability to provide anonymity
to accusers.
This dual use warrants an approach that
considers as nontestimonial only the introductory plea for help
that explains the nature of the emergency. Therefore, the
identity of the perpetrator or any information obtained as a
result of questioning by the 911 operator should be viewed as
testimonial. It should also be remembered that even in the
absence of the complainant, the admission of testimonial
excited utterances identifying a batterer can be harmless error,
because they either repeat information in excited utterances
made to private individuals or admissions of the defendant, or
there is other admissible evidence. So far, courts have not been
willing to extend any of the testimonial definitions to private
individuals outside of the child abuse context. 193

190

512 U.S. 594, 599 (1994).
111 P.3d 844 (Wash. 2005) (en banc).
192
Id. at 851.
193
See, e.g., People v. Compan, 100 P.3d 533, 538 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert.
granted, No. 04SC422, 2004 WL 2376474 (Colo. Oct 25, 2004) (extensive statements
made by domestic violence victim to a friend admitted as excited utterances were not
testimonial).
191
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V.

OTHER HEARSAY EXCEPTIONS FREQUENTLY USED IN
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES

A.

Statements for Medical Diagnosis and Treatment 194

Statements for medical diagnosis and treatment are
also staples in child abuse and domestic violence cases. While
a number of jurisdictions have permitted the identity of the
perpetrator to be admitted under Rule 803(4) in child abuse
cases, several courts have also extended the medical exception
in this fashion on the theory that in domestic violence
situations, the physician’s knowledge that the assailant was a
family or household member affects the treatment protocol,
including discharge to an appropriate environment. 195
United States v. Joe, 196 which admitted statements to a
physician identifying the victim’s estranged husband as having
raped her, explained why this use of Rule 803(4) was
appropriate. According to Joe,
All victims of domestic sexual abuse suffer emotional and
psychological injuries, the exact nature and extent of which depend
on the identity of the abuser. The physician generally must know
who the abuser was in order to render proper treatment because the
physician’s treatment will necessarily differ when the abuser is a
member of the victim’s family or household. In the domestic sexual
abuse case, for example, the treating physician may recommend
special therapy or counseling and instruct the victim to remove
herself from the dangerous environment by leaving the home and
seeking shelter elsewhere. In short, the domestic sexual abuser’s
identity is admissible under Rule 803(4) where the abuser has such
an intimate relationship with the victim that the abuser’s identity
becomes ‘reasonably pertinent’ to the victim’s proper treatment. 197

Post-Crawford, the key issue will be whether identifying
the perpetrator is testimonial. At least one court has taken
this view in relation to a woman raped in a case where
domestic violence was not implicated. In People v. West, 198
statements made to doctors regarding the nature of the alleged
194

For additional discussion regarding medical diagnosis and treatment
statements in child abuse cases, see Part VI.
195
See, e.g., State v. Sims, 890 P.2d 521, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Nash v.
State, 754 N.E.2d 1021, 1025 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001). But see People v. Swinger, 689
N.Y.S.2d 336, 340 (Crim. Ct. 1998) (admitting domestic violence victim’s statements
identifying who assaulted her under business records exception).
196
8 F.3d 1488, 1494-95 (10th Cir. 1993).
197
Id. at 1494-95.
198
823 N.E.2d 82, 89 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
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attack, and the cause of her symptoms and pain were viewed as
nontestimonial, but statements of fault or identity were
rejected as testimonial, because they implicate the core
concerns protected by the Confrontation Clause. 199
In contrast, other cases view all statements within Rule
803(4) as nontestimonial. Indeed, the complainant’s use of a
specialized healthcare facility designed to provide expert care
to victims of violent sexual assault, where she gave a statement
identifying the perpetrator, did not render the nurse’s
testimony as testimonial in State v. Stahl. 200 More typically,
some courts appear to treat any statements in medical records
as nontestimonial, whether relying on Rule 803(6), 803(4), or a
combination thereof. In People v. Rogers, 201 hospital records
containing a rape victim’s statements were assumed to be
admissible as business records. Similarly, a sexual assault
information sheet that had a dual purpose of investigation and
treatment of the victim’s potential physical and psychological
injuries did not violate Crawford since “the history was
germane to treatment, [so] it falls within the traditional
business records exception.” 202
Simply relying on Crawford’s reference to business
records as covering statements “that by their nature were not
testimonial” 203 appears misguided. Unlike 1791, business
records now include opinions and diagnoses, as well as double
hearsay of declarants who have no business duty to report
when the additional layer of hearsay fits within some other
exception. A more reasoned approach would be to treat dual
purpose documents as testimonial where their investigative
aspects are significant.
Recognizing that business records prepared for
litigation should be analyzed differently, Rogers did hold that a
report giving results of testing on victim’s blood was improperly
admitted as a business record, in a prosecution for first-degree
rape and first-degree sodomy. 204 The court considered the
report to be testimonial even though it was generated by a
private laboratory that conducted the tests, because it was
requested by and prepared for law enforcement for the purpose
199
200
201
202
203
204

Id. at 89-90.
No. 22261, 2005 WL 602687, slip op. at *7 (Ohio App. Mar. 16, 2005).
780 N.Y.S.2d 393 (App. Div. 2004).
Id.
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 (2004).
Rogers, 780 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
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of prosecution, and it was the basis for expert testimony as to
the victim’s intoxication level, which was directly related to her
ability to consent. 205 Similarly, in Smith v. State, 206 admission
of autopsy evidence and an autopsy report without testimony
by the medical examiner who performed the autopsy violated
the Confrontation Clause where the manner of death was an
element of the crime and the defendant claimed the killing was
in self-defense. In contrast, several cases have held a certified
copy of an autopsy report is nontestimonial. 207 It is difficult to
understand how an autopsy report would not fit within the
declarant/objective witness definitions, if not within the
functional equivalent of an ex parte affidavit test.
To the extent that the doctor has a reporting duty in
domestic violence cases, the argument can be made that the
statements are testimonial, either because the doctor is an
agent of the police or because an objective witness would view
the statements as available for prosecution. In addition,
VAWA has sponsored research on improving medical records in
domestic violence cases. 208 If a doctor adopts the protocols
suggested to aid healthcare providers to “help victims” by
selecting what to record and implicitly what to ask, and how to
record the statements, it is also arguable that the resulting
recording of the victim’s statements becomes testimonial. 209
B.

Dying Declarations

While only a small percentage of domestic violence cases
result in a female being killed, a third of all female single
victim killings are carried out by their male intimates, as well
as nearly two-thirds of nonstranger killings of females. 210
Ironically, dying declarations may be less of a factor in

205

Id. at 396-97.
898 So. 2d 907, 917 (Ala. Crim. App. 2004).
207
See, e.g., Denoso v. State, 156 S.W.3d 166, 182 (Tex. App. 2005)
(alternatively finding harmless error); People v. Durio, 794 N.Y.S.2d 863, 867-68 (Sup.
Ct. 2005).
208
See, e.g., NANCY E. ISAAC & V. PUALANI ENOS, NAT’L INST. OF JUST.,
DOCUMENTING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: HOW HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS CAN HELP
VICTIMS (NCJ 188564) (Sept. 2001), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/
nij/188564.pdf.
209
Id.
210
VIOLENCE POLICY CENTER, WHEN MEN MURDER WOMEN: AN ANALYSIS OF
2002 HOMICIDE DATA 3 (Sept. 2004), available at http://www.vpc.org/studies/
wmmw2004.pdf; see also RENNISON, supra note 65, at 2.
206
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domestic violence cases because the deaths often occur at home
with no witnesses.
Crawford appears to give an automatic pass to dying
declarations as being sui generis without determining whether
the rationale is one of forfeiture, necessity, or some type of
moralistic imperative. 211 This view has been almost universally
adopted by the courts that have reached the question. 212 For
example, in People v. Monterroso, 213 the California Supreme
Court held that dying declarations do not violate confrontation,
noting that “[d]ying declarations were admissible at common
law in felony cases, even when the defendant was not present
at the time the statement was taken.” Monterroso cites State v.
Houser 214 stating:
to exclude such evidence as violative of the right to confrontation
‘would not only be contrary to all the precedents in England and
here, acquiesced in long since the adoption of these constitutional
provisions, but it would be abhorrent to that sense of justice and
regard for individual security and public safety which its exclusion
in some cases would inevitably set at naught [sic].’ 215

Only one case has denied admission to a testimonial dying
declaration, claiming “there is no rationale in Crawford or
otherwise under which dying declarations should be treated
differently than any other testimonial statement.” 216
Regardless of the lack of historical or other justification, I
would be amazed if the Court rejected testimonial dying
declarations, not only because of the necessity underlying the
exception, but because most of these statements appear to fit
the forfeiture approach courts have adopted concerning
murdered declarants.
C.

Prior Inconsistent Statements

If the victim testifies, jurisdictions vary as to what type
of prior inconsistent statements can be admitted substantively.
This issue is significant because so many of the women who
testify in domestic violence cases recant. While approximately
211

541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004).
See State v. Martin, 695 N.W.2d 578, 584 (Minn. 2005).
213
101 P.3d 956, 971-72 (Cal. 2004), cert. denied, 74 U.S.L.W. 3203 (2005).
214
26 Mo. 431 (1858).
215
Monterroso, 101 P.3d at 972 (citing Houser, 26 Mo. at 438).
216
United States v. Jordan, No. CRIM. 04-CR-229-B, 2005 WL 513501, at *3
(D. Colo. Mar. 3, 2005).
212
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seventeen states permit any inconsistent statements
substantively, the remainder tend to follow the federal model
which requires a sworn statement in a proceeding. 217 Professor
Lininger has suggested amending the rule to include sworn
affidavits as is required in Oregon. 218 For example, in State v.
Thach, 219 the court noted that the sworn affidavit admitted in a
domestic violence case was properly admitted substantively
and since the victim testified, the Confrontation Clause was
not implicated. I agree that such an amendment is desirable in
jurisdictions that do not freely admit prior inconsistent
statements. However, I have never understood the benefit of
the oath and proceeding requirements in Rule 801(d)(1)(A),
given the vast amount of other hearsay made admissible by the
Rules. Indeed, the fact that inconsistent statements may be
permitted for impeachment, but not substantively, has caused
mischief in other contexts when the claim is made that the
impeachment evidence is being introduced solely to apprise the
jury of otherwise inadmissible evidence.
When the inconsistent statement is the only proof of an
essential element, sufficiency questions may arise in some
jurisdictions. In California, the substantial evidence test
adopted by People v. Cuevas 220 rejected the earlier rule
requiring corroboration of out-of-court identifications and held
that the sufficiency of an out-of-court identification to support a
conviction is to be determined under the substantial evidence
test.
The admission of prior inconsistent statements typically
does not pose a confrontation problem because the declarant is
present at trial, resulting in United States v. Owens 221 rather
than Crawford governing the analysis. While Crawford did not
specifically reference Owens, it cited California v. Green 222 for
the proposition that “when the declarant appears for crossexamination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no
constraints at all on the use of his prior testimonial
statements.” 223 Green specifically held that admission of a prior
217
See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN, 4 JONES ON EVIDENCE §§ 26.5-26.7 (7th ed. 2000
& Supp. 2004).
218
Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers, supra note 16, at 803-05.
219
No. 30757-0-II, 2005 WL 103136, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Jan. 19, 2005).
220
906 P.2d 1290, 1304 (Cal. 1995).
221
484 U.S. 554, 560 (1988).
222
399 U.S. 149 (1970).
223
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 59-60 n.9 (2004) (citing Green, 399
U.S. at 162).
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inconsistent statement did not violate the Confrontation
Clause when the declarant was given an opportunity to explain
or deny it. 224 The only potential wrinkle is when the witness is
essentially mute at trial, which is typically not the case with a
domestic violence complainant, who is either evasive, denies
making the statement, or claims she lied because she was
jealous or otherwise annoyed with the alleged battered.
Recently, Fowler v. State held that a complainant in a domestic
violence case who took the stand, but refused to answer
questions with no claim of privilege, was available for crossexamination under Crawford if no effort was made to have her
held in contempt or otherwise compelled to respond. 225 While
her statements were admitted as excited utterances, this mode
of analysis would also appear to apply to prior inconsistent
statements.
D.

Ad Hoc Hearsay Exceptions

California and Oregon have ad hoc hearsay exceptions
directed towards domestic violence victims. For example,
California has an exception for statements that narrate,
describe or explain the infliction or threat of physical injury
upon the declarant, which were made at or near the time of the
incident. 226 The California exception is limited to cases in
which the declarant is unavailable. Oregon’s statute permits
statements made up to twenty-four hours later. 227 Both require
that the statement be made to specific categories of individuals
such as law enforcement or other governmental or medical
personnel, unless in writing. 228 To the extent that a statute has
no application, other than to create a testimonial statement, it
will not survive a constitutional challenge. However, Oregon’s
exception also applies to statements made by testifying
declarants, 229 and both apply to written or trustworthy
statements that are arguably nontestimonial. 230 Thus, even if
224

Green, 399 U.S. at 162.
829 N.E.2d 459, 465-67 (Ind. 2005).
226
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(1) & (3) (West 2001). While broader than
domestic violence, the section was enacted as a reaction to the O.J. Simpson case, and
has been applied primarily in the domestic violence context.
227
OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460 (26)(a) (2002).
228
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370(a)(5); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460 (26)(a)(A).
229
See OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460.
230
See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 (a)(4) & (5); OR. REV. STAT. § 40.460(5), (18),
(28).
225
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unconstitutional in a particular application, the statute itself is
not unconstitutional. 231 In addition, if a state has enacted a
Rule 807 catch-all, which permits the admission of trustworthy
hearsay in the court’s discretion, the exception would also
apply in a number of domestic violence settings, and has been
used to admit diaries. 232 Post-Crawford reversals have occurred
in cases admitting statements pursuant to California’s
domestic violence exception. 233
Determining what is testimonial when the statement is
not made in a law enforcement context will be problematic
until the Court articulates its definition of what other types of
statements are accusatory. Whether from the perspective of a
declarant or an objective observer, factual distinctions will still
be important. For example, many women’s advocates tell
domestic violence victims to keep a diary so that if anything
happens, their voices will be heard. Even in a reliability
framework, some of these diaries were questioned as being selfserving. 234 If child custody or alimony was a consideration,
such knowledge would appear to make the diary testimonial,
admissible only if a forfeiture rationale applies. Other women
may keep a diary without any expectation of its potential use in
a prosecution. 235
After Crawford, ad hoc hearsay exceptions for recorded
victim statements to police still provide the necessary evidence
to convict when the complainant testifies, even if she recants,
For the
since Crawford clearly leaves Owens 236 intact.
confrontation analysis, it does not matter that the victim
recants as trial, or what exception the hearsay is admitted
under, so long as she testifies and is subject to cross231
See, e.g., People v. Compton, No. B163293, 2005 WL 236841, at *4 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 26, 2005) (section 1370 is not unconstitutional since it is not invalid under
every construction post-Crawford).
232
See, e.g., United States v. Treff, 924 F.2d 975, 982-83 (10th Cir. 1991) (preCrawford case which upheld admission of a diary under the residual hearsay exception,
even though the declarant’s attorney had advised the declarant to begin keeping the
diary in anticipation of litigation, because the diary contained circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness).
233
See, e.g., People v. Pantoja, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 494 (Ct. App. 2004);
People v. Zarazua, No. H025472, 2004 WL 837914, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 20, 2004).
234
See, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 282 F. Supp. 2d 399, 423 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(rejecting diary in light of the hotly contested divorce proceeding, which gave the
decedent a reason to fabricate or misrepresent her thoughts).
235
See, e.g., Parle v. Runnels, 387 F.3d 1030, 1037 (9th Cir. 2004) (diary
admitted pursuant to CAL. EVID. CODE § 1370 was not testimonial and satisfied Wright
test).
236
484 U.S. 554 (1988).
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examination, since the jury is able “to assess her demeanor as
she attempted to deny or explain away the prior statements.” 237
Pre-Crawford, my suggestion that a new hearsay
exception be adopted concerning domestic violence was
cautiously limited to domestic violence murder cases. 238 After
Crawford, though, I am inclined to argue for a broader
domestic violence exception based on trustworthiness. The
Supreme Court does not appear to have backed away from its
stance encouraging states to expand hearsay exceptions.
Therefore, jurisdictions should be urged to adopt a broad
domestic violence hearsay exception permitting trustworthy
statements concerning any incident of domestic violence or fear
induced by the actions of the defendant. Such an exception
should not contain availability limitations to avoid being
unconstitutional in all applications. 239 If any timing restriction
is added, admission should be confined to statements made
within the past five years. As with the catch-all exception,
notice of the intent to introduce evidence pursuant to this
exception should be required. The benefit of such an approach
is that the complainant’s statements would be admissible if the
witness is available at trial, without regard to limitations that
might otherwise be imposed on prior inconsistent statements.
More significantly, if the declarant is unavailable at trial and
the statement is deemed testimonial, it may still be admitted in
a specific case if the forfeiture doctrine applies.
VI.

EXCEPTIONS TO THE TESTIMONIAL BAN IN DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE CASES

A.

Prior Opportunity to Cross-Examine Unavailable (Adult)
Declarants

Crawford permits testimonial statements of unavailable
declarants, if the defendant had a “prior opportunity for crossThe traditional ways of satisfying this
examination.” 240
standard are through testimony at a prior trial or preliminary
hearing in the same case. While I agree with Professor
Mosteller that we should attempt to create more opportunities
237

People v. Martinez, 23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 508, 519 (Ct. App. 2005).
Raeder, Simpson and Beyond, supra note 15, at 1512-17.
239
Cf. People v. Pirwani, 14 Cal. Rptr. 3d 673 (Ct. App. 2004) (elder abuse
statute unconstitutional, where it admitted only testimonial statements).
240
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 54 (2004).
238

356

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

for pretrial cross-examination, 241 I am not as confident as he is
of the practicalities of such an approach. Even in Florida,
where defendants can take either a discovery or a preservation
of testimony deposition, conflict has arisen about whether the
discovery deposition satisfies confrontation in the absence of
the declarant at trial. Lopez v. State, a domestic violence
prosecution, held that a discovery deposition does not satisfy
the Confrontation Clause because the defendant is not entitled
to use the deposition substantively and is not on notice that the
deposition will perpetuate testimony, so the focus is different
from cross-examination at trial. 242 In contrast, in Blanton v.
State, 243 a child abuse case in which the defendant did not
introduce the discovery deposition at trial, and could have
requested a deposition to perpetuate testimony, the admission
of testimonial hearsay was not found to be a Confrontation
Clause violation.
There has been some discussion about a statutory
amendment in Florida to satisfy Crawford. 244 While Blanton
might also be read to shift the burden to the defendant to call
the declarant, most courts appear to be rejecting this
approach. 245 Roberts mandates that a preliminary hearing
must present an adequate opportunity for cross-examination.
The major failing in Florida appears to be that the discovery
deposition cannot be used substantively at trial. This could be
remedied by an amendment permitting substantive use by the
defendant when the declarant is unavailable and the
declarant’s statement is introduced at trial. 246
Limited cross-examination in preliminary hearings also
impacts the ability to survive a Confrontation Clause challenge
for testimonial hearsay. Blanton asks, but does not decide if
the opportunity for cross-examination has to be meaningful.
But, what is its purpose if it is simply a ritual? For example,
the court in People v. Fry 247 held that preliminary hearing
testimony violated Crawford when introduced at trial because
241

See Mosteller, supra note 14, at 609-10.
888 So. 2d 693, 701 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
243
880 So. 2d 798, 799-801 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
244
See John F. Yetter, Wrestling with Crawford v. Washington and the New
Constitutional Law of Confrontation, 78 FLA. B. J. 26, 31 (Oct. 2004).
245
See, e.g., State v. Cox, 876 So. 2d 932, 938 (La. Ct. App. 2004); Bratton v.
State, 156 S.W.3d 689, 693-94 (Tex. App. 2005).
246
See Yetter supra note 244, at 31 (suggesting stipulation or advance waiver
permitting substantive use at trial).
247
92 P.3d 970 (Colo. 2004).
242
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such hearings in Colorado do not present an adequate
In contrast, other
opportunity for cross-examination. 248
jurisdictions have viewed cross-examination at a probable
cause hearing as sufficient. 249 To the extent that preliminary
hearings do not provide for adequate cross-examination in
felony cases, jurisdictions should consider amending their
procedures to survive a Crawford challenge. To limit the
impact of such revisions on state practice, expanded hearings
could apply only to those categories of cases most likely to
result in witnesses not appearing for trial, such as domestic
violence and child abuse cases, as well as to the most serious
felonies.
Judges Karan and Gersten have suggested establishing
a fast track procedure for cross-examination of domestic
violence statements. 250 If I were defense counsel, it is unclear
that post-Crawford I would ask for a deposition unless I was
sure that the declarant intended to testify. However, the
prosecutor might, in domestic violence cases, routinely set an
early perpetuation deposition.
In most jurisdictions,
depositions in domestic violence cases would require a
statutory amendment. It is unclear how many states would
enact such a procedure, particularly when in misdemeanor
cases the declarant would not otherwise be required to appear
before trial. Moreover, it is often difficult for a woman to
appear, given childcare or job responsibilities, as well as
ambivalence as to whether to proceed at all. A fast track trial
setting of 30 to 45 days in misdemeanor cases might prove a
better route to providing witness attendance, especially if a
support team ensured that the witnesses would be available, or
if not, providing for rescheduling before the trial date and
without the need for the witness to appear and be told to come
again.
Attempts to set trials even sooner would likely meet
constitutional objections under a due process rationale by
defense counsel who could claim that they had insufficient time
248
Id. at 981; see also State v. Stuart, 695 N.W.2d 259, 266-67 (Wis. 2005)
(limited cross-examination at preliminary hearing rendered prior testimony
inadmissible at trial).
249
See, e.g., State v. Crocker, 852 A.2d 762, 787 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004); People
v. Hernandez, No. 253227, 2005 WL 562807, at *3 (Mich. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2005); see
also State v. Stuart, 695 N.W.2d 259, 265-67 (Wis. 2005) (limited cross-examination at
preliminary hearing rendered prior testimony inadmissible at trial).
250
Judge Amy Karan & Judge David M. Gersten, Domestic Violence: Hearsay
Exceptions in the Wake of Crawford v. Washington, 13 NCJFCJ 20, 23 (2004).
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to investigate the case and present a defense. 251 Ironically, the
prosecution might also be disadvantaged by immediate trials,
since in a world of scarce resources, investigation and
preparation of domestic violence misdemeanors may require
more time in order to obtain evidence to meet the government’s
burden of proof. For example, medical records and personnel
as well as the complainant and police officer would need to be
available.
Even when full cross-examination has occurred, this has
not ensured admission in the absence of the declarant. In State
v. Hale, 252 the court found a Confrontation Clause violation
when evidence was admitted as prior testimony, but was crossexamined by a codefendant at a separate trial. In other words,
this very defendant must cross-examine the declarant. While
this result appears harsh, it accords with the limitation that
prior testimony is limited to cases in which the defendant has
previously cross-examined the witness. Recently, using the
catch-all exception, cases have expanded the introduction of
prior testimony beyond its historic confines. As a matter of
constitutional dimension, if states can expand their hearsay
exceptions, it appears highly ritualistic to argue that the
testimony should be lost because a person with the same
motive and opportunity as the defendant was the crossexaminer. However, Crawford clearly disapproved of cases in
which the declarant’s prior testimony was examined by other
counsel. 253
B.

Waiver of Confrontation and Harmless Error

Post-Crawford, defendants can still waive the right to
confrontation by not raising the issue at trial, by opening the
door, or as a result of trial strategy. For example, when the
defendant in State v. Lasnetski called his wife to testify at trial,
he waived his right to challenge her testimonial hearsay, even
though he claimed his decision was not voluntary because it
was a result of the court’s erroneous pretrial ruling. 254 In
domestic violence cases, opening the door is often significant to
251
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712 (1974); Washington v.
Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18-19 (1967).
252
691 N.W.2d 637, 647 (Wis. 2005).
253
541 U.S. 36, 64-65 (2004) (citing State v. Bintz, 650 N.W.2d 913, 918-20
(Wis. Ct. App. 2002) and State v. McNeill, 537 S.E.2d 518, 523-24 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000)).
254
State v. Lasnetski, 696 N.W.2d 387, 393-94 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (trial
strategy acted as waiver).
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introducing a dead victim’s statements that demonstrate her
state of mind. In other words, such statements are typically
inadmissible because her state of mind is not relevant to any
issue at trial. 255 However, when the defense claims that the
decedent committed suicide, or her death was accidental or a
result of self-defense, it opens the door to the declarant’s state
of mind. 256
While opening the door is uncontroversial regarding
nontestimonial hearsay, some may question whether its use is
foreclosed concerning testimonial hearsay in the absence of any
misconduct by the defendant, since opening the door is an
evidentiary rule, rather than constitutional in nature. United
States v. Cromer 257 cites Crawford for the proposition that the
Confrontation Clause is not dependent upon the law of
Evidence. 258 Therefore, “the mere fact that Cromer may have
opened the door to the testimonial, out-of-court statement that
violated his confrontation right is not sufficient to erase that
violation.” 259 I disagree with the proposition that trial strategy
cannot waive rights of constitutional dimension. For example,
Michigan v. Lucas 260 held that excluding evidence of
defendant’s past sexual conduct with the victim for failure to
comply with rape shield’s notice and hearing is not a per se
violation of the Sixth Amendment. If trial strategy could result
in the loss of a constitutional right pre-Crawford, there is no
reason to require a different result post-Crawford.
A few post-Crawford decisions have recognized the
continuing viability of this doctrine. For example, in People v.
McMillian, 261 the defense counsel’s questioning of an officer in a
robbery trial led to the disclosure of an out of court testimonial

255
See Raeder, Simpson and Beyond, supra note 15, at 1506-17; see, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Levanduski, No. 937 EDA 2004, 2005 Pa. Super. LEXIS 497, at *1423 (Mar. 31, 2005) (Five-page torn-up letter found in trash was not testimonial, but
was inadmissible because it fit no hearsay exception. State of mind exception rejected
because content was being introduced for its truth that the decedent who was shot with
his own gun, feared his common-law wife and her lover, and predicted that if he was
found dead, it would not be suicide.).
256
See, e.g., People v. Abordo Espinosa, No. A102886, 2005 WL 941454, at *5
(Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2005) (evidence of domestic violence relevant to rebut defense
theory that shooting occurred in heat of passion in response to nagging, rather than as
the culmination of a pattern of abuse).
257
389 F.3d 662 (6th Cir. 2004).
258
Id. at 679 (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61).
259
Id.
260
500 U.S. 145, 152 (1991).
261
No. 244711, 2004 WL 979701, at *9 (Mich. Ct. App. May 6, 2004).
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statement. Similarly, in Le v. State, 262 the Court held that by
calling witnesses to testify about the decedent’s statements, the
defendant opened the door for the State to call a rebuttal
witness to contradict the defense witnesses’ testimony.
People v. Ko 263 raised this issue in a case where the
defense to murdering a former girlfriend was for the defendant
to blame his current girlfriend.
In its direct case, the
prosecution offered “testimony by a detective recounting
statements made by the girlfriend that a bloody shirt found at
the murder scene belonged to her, but was often worn by
defendant, and that the bloody pants found there belonged to
defendant.” 264 The court found that the defendant opened the
door to the admission of the entire statement concerning the
clothing found at the murder scene by raising the issue of the
clothing in his opening statement and in seeking leave in his
opposition to the People’s in limine motion, to introduce the
girlfriend’s statement that the shirt found belonged to her.
Once the defendant insisted upon introducing the portion of the
statement regarding the girlfriend’s ownership of the shirt, the
entire
statement
became
admissible
to
avoid
misrepresentation. The court reasoned that “[a] contrary
holding would allow a defendant to mislead the jury by
selectively revealing only those details of a testimonial
statement that are potentially helpful to the defense, while
concealing from the jury other details that would tend to
explain the portions introduced and place them in context.” 265
Ko viewed the doctrine of opening the door as having an
equitable basis, even if the behavior cannot be described as
misconduct. However, not all defense strategies will rise to the
level that will permit rebuttal by testimonial statements. 266
Given that Crawford completely changed the
Confrontation Clause landscape, it was predictable that the
government would turn to harmless error as the only way to
prevent a massive number of reversals of convictions that were
obtained in a world ruled by reference to trustworthiness, not
testimonial statements. Indeed, harmless error appears alive
262
No. 2002-DP-01855-SCT, 2005 WL 977007, at *24 (Miss. Apr. 28, 2005); see
also State v. Harris, 871 A.2d 341, 345-46 (R.I. 2005) (defendant’s use of witness
statement to police in cross-examination waived confrontation issue on appeal).
263
789 N.Y.S.2d 43 (App. Div. 2005).
264
Id. at 44.
265
Id. at 45.
266
See, e.g., People v. Ryan, 790 N.Y.S.2d 723, 726 (App. Div. 2005) (crossexamination in robbery trial did not leave misleading impression).
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and well after Crawford. While one might assume that the
admission of testimonial statements would be prejudicial
enough to doom most attempts to demonstrate harmless error,
many cases have survived reversal on this ground. 267
C.

The Role of Forfeiture in Domestic Violence Cases

Crawford virtually invited prosecutors to raise claims of
forfeiture when facing Confrontation Clause challenges by
opining,
[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes
confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds; it does not
purport to be an alternative means of determining reliability. 268

Some prosecutors are already arguing that domestic
violence cases by their nature involve forfeiture when the
victim does not testify. They claim defendants invariably
either actually threaten complainants or, given the
circumstances of their relationships, such women are afraid
that their testimony will cause further violence. 269 It is likely
that forfeiture will be a factor in a number of domestic violence
cases, and prosecutors are correct to worry that the testimonial
approach gives defendants more incentive to keep women from
testifying. However, forfeiture cannot be assumed without
specific evidence linking a defendant to a complainant’s failure
to testify at trial. 270 In other words, even though empirical
evidence from the Quincy Project, which tracked courtrestrained male abusers, found high percentages of physical
and economic threats by abusers to women who cooperated
with the police as well as threats of loss of children, 271 this does

267
See, e.g., Sparkman v. State, No. CACR 04-268, 2005 WL 1231710 (Ark. Ct.
App. May 25, 2005) (child abuse); People v. Abordo Espinosa, No. A102886, 2005 WL
941454, at *5 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 25, 2005); State v. Courtney, 696 N.W.2d 73, 81
(Minn. 2005); Davis v. State, No. 03-04-00014-CR, 2005 WL 1173964, at *11 (Tex. App.
May 19, 2005) (not yet released for publication); State v. Davis, 111 P.3d 844, 851
(Wash. 2005) (domestic violence cases).
268
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
269
See, e.g., Adam Krischer, Though Justice May Be Blind, It Is Not Stupid:
Applying Common Sense to Crawford in Domestic Violence Cases, 38 PROSECUTOR 14,
15-16 (2004).
270
See Hutton, supra note 102, at 72.
271
See E.S. BUZAWA & C.G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE 88 (James A. Inciardi, 2d ed. 1996) (examined victim, incident,
abuser, and defendant characteristics for 663 restraining order cases over a two-year
period).

362

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

not provide evidence in an individual case connecting the
defendant to the woman’s failure to appear.
Crawford cites Reynolds, a witness tampering case, for
its acceptance of forfeiture. 272 It is unclear how broadly
Reynolds will be interpreted since the actual case involved both
witness tampering and a declarant who had been previously
cross-examined. 273 Therefore, in light of Crawford’s holding,
the evidence would have satisfied confrontation without any
need to invoke forfeiture. Historically, forfeiture was also
limited to witness tampering cases. 274 Post-Crawford, several
courts have applied the doctrine to admit statements of
murdered victims, where witness tampering is not involved. 275
In United States v. Garcia-Meza, 276 where the defendant was
charged with stabbing his wife to death, the Court specifically
noted that the federal forfeiture hearsay exception’s
requirement, that the defendant intended to prevent the
witness from testifying, did not control the constitutional
analysis of forfeiture.
It should be noted that in most domestic violence
murder cases the doctrine is being used constitutionally to
overcome the testimonial bar rather than to provide a hearsay
exception, since forfeiture hearsay exceptions are generally
limited to witness tampering. 277 In other words, some other
exception, such as an excited utterance or a catch-all ensures
the reliability of the statement. For example, in People v.
Moore, 278 a domestic violence homicide case, the decedent’s
statement was admitted as an excited utterance to a police
officer. The court found that the victim’s unavailability to
testify was because of her death and that her death was the
result of defendant’s action, forfeiting his right to claim a
confrontation violation. 279 State v. Meeks, 280 a murder case not
272
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145,
158-59 (1879)).
273
Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 150.
274
See generally James F. Flanagan, Forfeiture By Wrongdoing and Those
Who Acquiesce in Witness Intimidation: A Reach Exceeding Its Grasp and Other
Problems with Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(6), 51 DRAKE L. REV. 459 (2003); John
R. Kroger, The Confrontation Waiver Rule, 76 B.U. L. REV. 835 (1996).
275
See, e.g., People v. Taylor, No. A095412, 2005 WL 715973, at *3-4 (Cal. Ct.
App. Mar. 30, 2005) (summarizing case law).
276
403 F.3d 364, 370 (6th Cir. 2005).
277
See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(6).
278
117 P.3d 1, 7 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004).
279
Id. at 11.
280
88 P.3d 789 (Kan. 2004).
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involving domestic violence, where the statement appeared to
be a dying declaration to a police officer, reached the same
result. 281 The California Supreme Court has granted review to
determine whether a defendant forfeited his Confrontation
Clause claim regarding admission of the victim’s prior
statements concerning an incident of domestic violence because
the defendant killed the victim, thus rendering her unavailable
to testify at trial, and whether the doctrine applies where the
alleged “wrongdoing” is the same as the offense for which the
defendant was on trial. 282
Is there justification for not requiring witness
tampering in the forfeiture context when a defendant is
charged with murder of the declarant? Crawford left the door
open to permit a dying declaration exception to the testimonial
approach. As a practical matter, many of the forfeiture cases
fit the same rationale.
The difference is that dying
declarations are narrowly focused statements made with
knowledge of impending death, and do not admit the decedent’s
other relevant hearsay. In my view, we need to separate the
forfeiture hearsay exception from the constitutional forfeiture
doctrine. The forfeiture hearsay exception should be limited to
witness tampering because it has the potential to admit
unreliable evidence. 283 However, forfeiture as a constitutional
doctrine should apply to admit testimonial hearsay that
otherwise fits an existing exception when the declarant has
been killed, and evidence identifies the defendant as the
perpetrator. The hearsay would already have met a reliability
check, either by category (e.g., excited utterance) or, if it is an
ad hoc exception, by a trustworthiness or corroboration
requirement embedded in the exception.
However, I question whether totally unreliable hearsay
should come in by forfeiture, but believe that a constitutional
witness tampering requirement for cases in which the victim is
alleged to have been killed by the defendant disserves justice in
281
Id. at 791, 794-95 (citing Brief for Law Professors Sherman J. Clark et al.
as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 24, n.16, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36 (2004) (No. 02-9410); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation and the Definition of
Chutzpa, 31 ISRAEL L. REV. 506, 516 (1997)).
282
People v. Giles, 102 P.3d 930 (Cal. 2004) (statement was admitted
pursuant to California Evidence Code Section 1370 discussed supra at text
accompanying note 226).
283
See, e.g., Com. v. Edwards, 830 N.E.2d 158, 170 n.21 (Mass. 2005) (noting
that there may be some statements so lacking in reliability that their admission would
raise due process concerns).
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the same way that the exclusion of a dying declaration on
testimonial grounds is not viewed as a constitutional option.
Particularly in the domestic violence context, the victim is
likely to be at home, rather than in some public place where
people would hear her final words. Thus, prior statements
concerning her abuse that are otherwise admissible act as the
equivalent of dying declarations.
In contrast, constitutional forfeiture of a live declarant
should require a witness tampering rationale since that nexus
is necessary for an approach that is not based on a knowing
waiver, nor is compelled by the historic record. The problem in
determining if forfeiture has occurred is that the declarant is
absent, so we will often not have statements by her
establishing threats by the defendant. Studies have found that
many women do face pressure, but that is not evidence that a
particular defendant intimidated the witness. Other reasons
may cause her absence including: her emotional ties to the
batterer, the potential loss of financial support for herself and
her children if he is convicted, or her belief that she can control
the battering by the use of an arrest without prosecution. In
addition, in a growing number of cases, she may worry that her
batterer’s prosecution will result in her children being placed in
foster care or in her facing charges of child endangerment. 284
Immigrant women also worry about deportation of their
spouses or themselves even though changes in 1994 to VAWA
permit domestic violence victims who are the spouses of
citizens or permanent residents to apply for permanent
residency. 285
The Court of Appeals in Hammon v. State 286 recognized
the difficulty of providing evidence of forfeiture. It questioned
the definition of “wrongdoing” by a defendant, asking if another
battery was required, or whether psychological pressure on a
victim not to cooperate is enough, and if so, how is such
pressure to be measured? 287 Psychological pressure should be
sufficient since that is how the defendant maintains control of
284

See sources cited supra note 96.
See, e.g., Leslye E. Orloff et al., Battered Immigrant Women’s Willingness
to Call for Help and Police Response, 13 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 43, 68, 77-79 (2003);
Deborah A. Morgan, Comment, Access Denied: Barriers to Remedies Under the Violence
Against Women Act for Limited English Proficient Battered Immigrant Women, 54 AM.
U. L. REV. 485 (2004).
286
809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 829 N.E.2d
444, 453 (Ind. 2005).
287
Id. at 951-52 n.3.
285
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the battered woman and is a recognized feature of the cycle of
violence and post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). 288 These
pressures often result in a victim’s lack of cooperation. Thus,
in determining forfeiture, evidence that a woman suffers from
PTSD should be considered a significant factor. Previous
history should also be factored into the analysis, including
prior charges of abuse and any previous recantations by the
declarant.
Unfortunately, prosecutors may need to expend more
resources to obtain evidence of forfeiture in cases involving
battered, rather than dead, victims. This could require sending
an advocate or officer to talk to the complainant or to neighbors
who may have information. Adam Krischer has provided a
number of valuable suggestions about obtaining evidence to
support forfeiture. 289 For example, phone records subpoenaed
from jail may reveal tapes or explain a recantation at trial.
Voicemail messages, e-mail, or caller ID logs indicating large
numbers of calls may also be useful. However, it is unclear
whether such resources would be available for misdemeanors,
which encompass a large percentage of the domestic violence
caseload.
The forfeiture decision is a preliminary fact question for
the judge, so unless state practice requires admissible evidence,
the court can consider hearsay in its determination. Because
forfeiture can have a significant impact at trial, a few states
require clear and convincing evidence for the preliminary
showing. However, this standard is no longer favored in
constitutional analysis. Since voluntariness of confessions and
Miranda violations are determined by a preponderance of the
evidence, 290 it is difficult to argue that forfeiture requires a
higher standard, whether in a hearsay exception or for
constitutional purposes. Indeed, the only constitutional right
that currently appears to impose a clear and convincing
evidence standard is found in the nearly forty-year-old decision
of United States v. Wade. 291

288

See generally Raeder, The Double-Edged Sword, supra note 16.
Krischer, supra note 269, at 15.
290
Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986) (Miranda); Lego v. Twomey,
404 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1972) (voluntariness).
291
388 U.S. 218 (1967) (independent evidence that an identification was based
on observations of the suspect other than at the improperly held pretrial lineup).
289
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Rehabilitating a Recanting Witness

When the complainant recants, besides the use of prior
inconsistent statements, and admissible hearsay, 292 counsel
should consider expert evidence to explain the effects of the
cycle of violence. I have argued elsewhere that this evidence
should not be limited to BWS testimony. 293 It is difficult for
jurors and even judges to understand why a woman would lie
in court and subject herself to potential perjury charges to
protect the person who battered her. A judge explained:
One of your prosecutors said something to me that really helped my
view. It relates to what you’re talking about, what you see at ground
zero when the officer is out there and then what the victims do later.
She said that we all have to recognize that it’s easier for the victim
to lie to us, the judge, the prosecutor, the lawyers, than it is for her
to lie to her abuser. 294

In addition, prosecutors should consider obtaining
information such as that suggested by Adam Krischer in
supporting claims of forfeiture. 295 For example, subpoenaing
phone records from jail may reveal tapes that explain why a
victim recanted. Voicemail messages, e-mail, or caller ID logs
indicating large numbers of calls may also be useful. In People
v. Martinez, 296 the tape and transcript of the victim’s
conversation with the defendant and her son-in-law during a
jail visit after the preliminary hearing disclosed the defendant
repeatedly apologizing and her repeatedly telling him she loved
and needed him. They talked about how to get this incident
behind them and reunite and her son-in-law said the two of
them would have to “get a story going and . . . make sure it
sounds right.” 297 While the legal basis for the impeachment
was not mentioned, it appears to go to the issue of bias, which
would permit extrinsic evidence.

292
No confrontation problem exists when the declarant testifies at trial. See,
e.g., United States v. Green, 125 Fed. Appx. 659, 662 (6th Cir. 2005) (because domestic
violence complainant testified at trial, no need to determine if her 911 statements were
testimonial in nature).
293
See Raeder, The Better Way, supra note 16, at 150; Raeder, The DoubleEdged Sword, supra note 16, at 816.
294
Feature: A Roundtable Discussion on Domestic Violence, 42 HOUSTON LAW.
24, 32 (2004) (quoting Judge Warne).
295
Krischer, supra note 269, at 15.
296
23 Cal. Rptr. 3d 508, 513 (Ct. App. 2005).
297
Id.
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REVISIONING THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTORIAL
MODEL BY ADOPTING A MULTI-TRACK SYSTEM

As the preceding discussion has demonstrated, while
society has recently devoted substantial resources to
eliminating domestic violence, the combination of practical and
constitutional constraints on holding batterers accountable
justifies reconsidering the role of the criminal justice system in
combating domestic violence.
For at least a decade,
uncooperative complainants have been viewed as a problem,
and the criminal justice response to domestic violence as the
panacea. While dangerous batterers must be held accountable,
it is unclear that we are using our limited resources wisely in
misdemeanors. Even more distressing, we appear not to be
able to easily distinguish the truly dangerous offenders from
those who are a lesser threat and are also more likely to be
reeducated. 298 In a time frame of limited public resources, we
cannot do more with less, particularly in the post-Crawford
era. Thus, we must be smarter about identifying dangerous
offenders, changing the process and penalties for
misdemeanants, and bettering the lives of women and children
by making sure they are survivors, rather than victims. I view
my suggestions as consistent with the long standing trend
towards “coordinated community response,” 299 which combines
prosecutorial and private resources to better serve battered
women. Indeed, much of what I advocate is not new, 300 but is
simply more focused on a criminal justice response in the wake
of Crawford, when it has become clear that the “evidence”
based prosecutorial approach is no longer the best strategy.
However, before reaching the question of how domestic
violence cases should be categorized, we must evaluate how

298

See Sack, supra note 88, at 1736 (discussing studies).
See id. at 1725-36.
300
See generally id.
See also THE CONFERENCE OF STATE COURT
ADMINISTRATORS (“COSCA”), POSITON PAPER ON SAFETY AND ACCOUNTABILITY: STATE
COURTS AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (Nov. 2004) (discussing problems and approaches
and providing a blueprint for judicial action that includes adopting statewide models
for domestic violence courts, a plan for a multi-jurisdictional response, multi-agency
partnerships, sufficient resources, judicial training, and a National Plan), available at
http://cosca.ncsc.dni.us/PositionPapers/SafetyAccountability-DomesticViolence-Nov04.pdf [hereinafter COSCA Report]. Based on the report, the Conference of Chief
Justices agreed to establish a national action plan concerning domestic violence
(Resolution
32
adopted
Jan.
2005,
available
at
http://ccj.ncsc.dni.us/
DomesticViolenceResolutions/SafetyandAccountabilityStateCourtsandDomesticViolenc
e.pdf).
299
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mandatory arrest and no-drop policies are working. 301 Can the
police really identify the primary offender, or are they simply
arresting both parties? Similarly, is there empirical data about
how many women really lose their children to foster care or are
being charged with child endangerment due to their
victimization?
What are the relative advantages and
disadvantages for women and the system in obtaining criminal
versus civil protective orders; what type of enforcement should
be provided for a breach; and how does Crawford impact the
decision for a civil rather than criminal remedy? While mutual
protective orders have been very problematic for women,
current practice sometimes makes this the easy option and
gives some batterers a legal weapon to be used against their
victims. No one wants to return to days when domestic
violence was ignored, but if battered women are being
disadvantaged by the policies that were instituted on their
behalf, it is time to reassess whether the best policies are in
place. Since there is a good deal of literature and some
empirical data on both sides of the divide, 302 one possibility is to
301
See, e.g., Barbara Fedders, Lobbying for Mandatory-Arrest Policies: Race,
Class, and the Politics of the Battered Women’s Movement, 23 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC.
CHANGE 281 (1997); Erin L. Han, Mandatory Arrest and No-Drop Policies: Victim
Empowerment in Domestic Violence Cases, 23 B. C. THIRD WORLD L. J. 159 (2003);
Holly Maguigan, Wading Into Professor Schneider’s “Murky Middle Ground” Between
Acceptance and Rejection of Criminal Justice Responses to Domestic Violence, Violence,
11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 427 (2003); Linda G. Mills, Intuition and Insight:
A New Job Description for the Battered Woman’s Prosecutor and Other More Modest
Proposals, 7 UCLA WOMEN’S L. J. 183 (1997); Prentice L. White, Stopping the Chronic
Batterer Through Legislation: Will it Work This Time?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 709 (2004);
Jessica Dayton, Note, The Silencing of a Woman’s Choice: Mandatory Arrest and No
Drop Prosecution Policies in Domestic Violence Cases, 9 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L. J. 281,
284-85 (2003); Nichole Miras Mordini, Note, Mandatory State Interventions for
Domestic Abuse Cases: An Examination of the Effects on Victim Safety and Autonomy,
52 DRAKE L. REV. 295 (2004).
302
See, e.g., ANGELA GOVER et al., U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., LEXINGTON COUNTY
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE COURT: A PARTNERSHIP AND EVALUATION (NCJ 204023) (2004),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/204023.pdf; NAT’L INST. OF JUST.,
VIOLENCE & VICTIMIZATION RESEARCH DIVISION, COMPENDIUM OF RESEARCH ON
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1993-2004 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
nij/vawprog/vaw_portfolio.pdf; DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: SUMMARIES FOR
JUSTICE PROFESSIONALS (NCJ 202564) (Barabara Smith ed., 2003), available at
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/202564.pdf;
NAT’L INST. OF JUST., LEGAL
INTERVENTIONS IN FAMILY VIOLENCE: RESEARCH FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS
(NCJ 171666) (1998), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/171666.pdf; VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND FAMILY VIOLENCE: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH, PRACTICE, AND
POLICY (NCJ 199701) (Bonnie Fisher, ed., 2004), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles1/nij/199701.pdf. See generally JEFFREY FAGAN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF
JUSTICE RESEARCH REPORT (NCJ 157641), THE CRIMINALIZATION OF DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: PROMISES AND LIMITS (1996), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffiles/crimdom.pdf.
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create a government-sponsored National Conference or
Commission that would include representatives of the major
stakeholders in the domestic violence criminal justice
community, whose mission would be to go beyond a discussion
of best practices, and instead struggle with the difficult task of
drafting principles or model legislation that promote uniform
policy and standards. 303
In terms of prosecution, I propose that the traditional
criminal justice track be divided into three separate tracks.
Ideally, all domestic violence cases would be kept together,
regardless of the track. 304 In other words, simply prosecuting
some cases as felonies, rather than misdemeanors, will not be
optimal if the cases are dispersed among prosecutors and
judges. Also, victim advocates are required to ensure the cases
do not get lost and that necessary services are provided. The
Risky Violent Offender Track would apply to cases resulting in
death, rape or other serious physical injuries, weapons-based
offenses, multiple victim abusers, defendants with previous
convictions, and defendants who meet defined criteria of
dangerousness. It would provide a social service network to
surviving battered women and their children. Advocates would
help them navigate the court system and encourage their
cooperation. Early preliminary hearings would be set in
felonies to provide an opportunity for cross-examination to
minimize the loss of key evidence if the woman refuses to
testify at trial. Misdemeanors would be set within thirty to
forty-five days to ensure the greatest likelihood of obtaining the
complainant’s testimony. Women would be subpoenaed, but
material witness or bench warrants would be issued only in the
most serious cases, which would be determined by protocols.
Advocates would also help document evidence of forfeiture and
look for additional sources of evidence that might be suggested
by phone records, or transcripts of jailhouse visit conversations.
Federal as well as state weapons-based offenses would
be considered for the Risky Violent Offender Track, because
these are often both easier to prove and carry significant

303
Cf. COSCA Report, supra note 300. My suggestion for a National
Conference is somewhat broader than that proposed by the Conference of Chief
Justices since it encompasses law enforcement as well as judicial responses.
304
For discussion of a dedicated high volume misdemeanor domestic violence
court, see Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial Responses to Domestic Violence:
The Case for a Problem Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (2000).

370

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

penalties. 305 Charging federal felonies specifically targeting
domestic violence should also be more vigorously encouraged. 306
Working relationships should be set up between federal and
state prosecutors, so that appropriate state violators can be
referred for federal weapons or kidnapping prosecutions, as
well as for interstate domestic violence offenses. The initial
challenge will be to correctly identify risky offenders who have
the potential to escalate violence and pose a significant threat
to the lives of the complainants. Formulas to aid in such
identification currently exist and standards should be
developed on a national level to ensure the best research and
uniformity of practice. 307
States should also review their evidence rules to ensure
the admission of appropriate expert testimony concerning the
effects of battering. 308 If necessary, Rule 404(b) should be
amended to admit prior domestic violence evidence as to the
As I have argued elsewhere, propensity
same victim. 309
evidence should not be allowed, but motive, plan, and identity
evidence should be widely received. As previously mentioned, a
broad domestic violence hearsay exception should be enacted.
Counseling and social services for the women, including advice
on employment and educational options should be provided.
Coordination between social services and criminal justice
victim services should also be encouraged. If the criminal
justice system cannot actually provide these services, it should
be able to refer women to existing social programs, so they do
not have to find their own way through the different
bureaucracies.
The remaining cases would be divided into two tracks,
again within a system where domestic violence cases are kept
together. One track would be diversionary for offenders with
305
Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 525,
599-600 (2003).
306
See, e.g., DUROSE, supra note 68, at 51 (from 2000-2002, only 757 suspects
were referred for federal prosecution for violations of federal domestic violence laws).
307
See, e.g., Judge Amy Karan et al., A Lawyer’s Guide to Assessing
Dangerousness for Domestic Violence, 78 FLA. B.J. 55 (Mar. 2004); JANICE ROEHL ET
AL., INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE RISK ASSESSMENT VALIDATION STUDY: THE RAVE
STUDY PRACTITIONER SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS: VALIDATION OF TOOLS FOR
ASSESSING RISK FROM VIOLENT INTIMATE PARTNERS, (NCJ 209732) (May 2005),
available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209732.pdf.
308
See Raeder, The Better Way, supra note 16, at 151, 160; see also Deborah
Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Batterering: A Call to
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 999-1002 (2004).
309
See Raeder, Simpson and Beyond, supra note 15, at 1505; see also
Tuerkheimer, supra note 308, at 989-98.

2005]

REMEMBER THE LADIES AND THE CHILDREN TOO

371

no more than two arrests and no previous domestic violence
convictions. The other track would be for cases in which
women do not want to press charges from the outset and the
batterer does not fit whatever violent offender profile is used in
the jurisdiction. While there has been discussion about the
effectiveness of batterer’s programs, the Diversionary Track
would require completion of an approved anger management
program that incorporates education about the dynamics of
battering. In this regard, more attention must be given to the
content of such programs to ascertain their effectiveness. 310 In
addition, employment counseling would be available and the
defendant would be expected to financially provide for his
family. Appropriate programs or referrals would be provided
for the women to better understand their options. Unlike the
Risky Violent Offender Track, where an unstated goal is to
have the woman realize that she and her children ultimately
need to leave the batterer when it is safe to do so and to
develop an interim safety plan, the Diversionary Track would
function like a social service safety net for families that will
likely remain intact if the violence is stopped.
The final track would include other cases not fitting
within either the Risky Violent Offender or Diversionary
Track.
This Middle Track would mainly consist of
misdemeanors, but could include felonies with perceived
evidentiary problems, or where the injury is serious, but the
defendant does not fit the dangerous offender profile. It might
also include cases where the defendant refuses diversion. In
my view, even in this track a woman’s decision not to prosecute
should be honored in light of the literature on victim autonomy
and the lack of empirical evidence indicating any correlation
with lessening violence and prosecutorial no-drop policies. 311
The discussion by the Court of Appeals in Fowler on this point
is instructive:

310

Amanda Dekki, Note, Punishment or Rehabilitation? The Case for StateMandated Guidelines for Batterer Intervention Programs in Domestic Violence Cases,
18 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 549 (2004).
311
See, e.g., Eve Buzawa et al., Responses to Domestic Violence in a Pro-Active
Court Setting, in DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: SUMMARIES FOR JUSTICE
PROFESSIONALS, supra note 302, at 20 (concluding that for first-time offenders and less
serious cases, courts should honor a victim’s wishes to have the case dismissed); see
also Linda G. Mills, Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State
Intervention, 113 HARV. L. REV. 550, 569-70 (1999); Nichole Miras Mordini, Note,
Mandatory State Interventions for Domestic Abuse Cases: An Examination of the Effects
on Victim Safety and Autonomy, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 295, 318-21 (2004).
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[J]ust before trial, Officer Decker apparently had threatened A.R.
with a charge of filing a false police report if she refused to testify
against Fowler. The prosecutor also asked the trial court to direct
A.R. to answer his questions regarding whether Fowler had battered
her, which the trial court refused to do. Given the psychological
complexities of domestic violence cases, it is not at all clear to us that
such an approach in trying to “encourage” a victim to testify is
desirable. One recent scholarly article estimates that between
eighty and ninety percent of domestic violence victims recant their
accusations or refuse to cooperate with a prosecution. The reasons
why a victim might choose to recant or not cooperate are varied and
complex, including a fear of additional violence by the abuser, a
belief that the abuser will “change” if no prosecution occurs, and
legitimate economic concerns if the abuser was the primary financial
provider and is facing prison time. 312

Indeed, the Indiana Supreme Court’s decision in Fowler
agreed that domestic violence victims should not be placed in
the situation of being intimidated not only by the batterer, but
also by the State and its representatives. However, the
Indiana Supreme Court also opined that the Court of Appeals
understated the problem because a threat to file charges for
making a false crime report is only appropriate if the
prosecutor has reason to believe the complainant lied, which in
turn would mean that no prosecution of the defendant is
proper. 313 Ultimately, the goal for the Middle Track should be
to provide social services and encourage women to leave the
batterer or create viable safety plans, and to cooperate with the
criminal prosecution. Similar to the timing for the Risky
Violent Offender Track, misdemeanors should be set for trial
within thirty to forty-five days to ensure the maximum
possibility of cooperation by the victim.
Beyond a tracking system, Professor Donna Coker has
suggested that spending VAWA money to increase the
economic resources available to women might provide better
results than our current prosecutorial practices. 314 Resort to

312
Fowler v. State, 809 N.E.2d 960, 965 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (citing Tom
Lininger, Evidentiary Issues in Federal Prosecutions of Violence Against Women, 36
IND. L. REV. 687, 709 n.76 (2003)); see also United States v. Gilbert, 391 F.3d 882, 886
(7th Cir. 2004) (Defendant convicted of possession of a firearm conviction, which was
reversed due to the admission of the defendant’s estranged wife’s statement pursuant
to a residual exception. In Gilbert, the wife attempted to recant the statements shortly
after the search, claiming that the officers had threatened her and that she feared she
would lose her five children.).
313
829 N.E.2d 459, 471 (Ind. 2005).
314
Donna Coker, Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic
Violence Law: A Critical Review, 4 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 801, 858 (2001); see also Donna

2005]

REMEMBER THE LADIES AND THE CHILDREN TOO

373

mediation and restorative justice reconciliation approaches
should be carefully considered, but only employed in
circumstances where the complainant would not be
disadvantaged. 315 Ultimately, we need to empower women and
provide families with opportunities to help them reinvision
their own lives.
The criminal justice system has an important role in
stopping family violence, punishing risky offenders, providing
disincentives for misdemeanor batterers, and giving
appropriate defendants a chance to turn around their lives
through diversion. In many places, though, we seem to be
merely going through the motions. Most domestic violence
cases are treated as misdemeanors, and those batterers who
are arrested and jailed tend to receive short jail terms, without
regard to whether this makes them more dangerous or
conversely more likely to lose their jobs. Complainants’ wishes
also tend to be devalued, with little assistance either to the
women or to the family unit. We should view Crawford as an
opportunity to re-evaluate how the system is working, fix
whatever is broken, and not be afraid to try new approaches to
ensure a better life for women and children at risk.
VIII.

CHILD ABUSE

A.

The Empirical Evidence Concerning Child Abuse

Like domestic violence, the explosion in child abuse
prosecutions is a relatively recent phenomenon. Prior to 1963,
child abuse reporting laws were nonexistent, but by 1967, each
of the fifty states had enacted mandatory reporting of child
abuse laws. 316 In 1974, Congress passed the Child Abuse

Coker, Addressing Domestic Violence Through a Strategy of Economic Rights, 24
WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 187, 187-89 (Summer/Fall 2003).
315
See, e.g., Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of
Mediation in Domestic Violence Cases, 46 S.M.U. L. REV. 2117 (1993); C. Quince
Hopkins et al., Applying Restorative Justice to Ongoing Intimate Violence: Problems
and Possibilities, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 289, 295-96 (2004); Jane C. Murphy &
Robert Rubinson, Domestic Violence and Mediation: Responding to the Challenges of
Crafting Effective Screens, 39 FAM. L.Q. 53 (Spring 2005); Smith, supra note 104;
Dekki, supra note 310; Alana Dunnigan, Comment, Restoring Power to the Powerless:
The Need to Reform California’s Mandatory Mediation for Victims of Domestic Violence,
37 U.S.F. L. REV. 1031 (2003); Sarah Krieger, Note, The Dangers of Mediation in
Domestic Violence Cases, 8 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 235 (2002).
316
NAT’L CLEARINGHOUSE ON CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT INFO., U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTING
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Prevention and Treatment Act (“CAPTA”), which required
states to mandate the reporting of child abuse and demonstrate
the existence of specific programs and procedures in order to
qualify for possible federal grants under the Act. 317 Most states
specify which professionals are required to report, increasing
the list of mandatory reporters to include nurses, dentists,
social workers, school personnel, child care providers, law
enforcement officers, clergymen, and even pharmacists,
firefighters, and paramedics. Approximately eighteen states
require any person who suspects abuse to report it to the
proper authorities. 318
While the domestic violence statistics dwarf those for
child abuse, these cases grip the public because they involve
exploitation of the most vulnerable victims. The introductory
findings to the 2003 revision of CAPTA state that each year,
approximately 900,000 American children are victims of abuse
and neglect, and that approximately nineteen percent of those
children suffered physical abuse, ten percent suffered sexual
abuse, and five percent suffered emotional maltreatment. 319
Defying many perceptions, a third of child victimizers in state
prison had committed their crime against their own child and
half had a relationship with the victim as a friend,
acquaintance, or other relative. 320 Thirty percent reported they
Three-quarters of the violent
had multiple victims. 321
victimizations of children took place in either the victim or
offender’s home. 322
Child abuse cases are often difficult for prosecutors to
win because the abuse takes place in secret, there is typically
no physical evidence of abuse in molestation cases not
LAWS 1 (2002) [hereinafter CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTING
LAWS].
317
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, Pub. L. No. 93-247, 88 Stat. 4
(1974) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5119).
318
See CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTING LAWS, supra
note 316; Asaph Glosser et al., The Lewin Group, Statutory Rape: A Guide to State
Laws and Reporting Requirements 12 (2004), available at http://www.lewin.com/
Lewin_Publications/Human_Services/StateLawsReport.htm.
319
Keeping Children and Families Safe Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-36, 117 Stat.
800 (amending CAPTA); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., CHILD
MALTREATMENT
2003,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/publications/cm03/
cm2003.pdf.
320
LAWRENCE A. GREENFIELD, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., CHILD VICTIMIZERS:
VIOLENT OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 10 (1996), available at http://www.usdoj/
bjs/pub/pdf/cvvoat.pdf (last visited Aug. 24, 2005).
321
Id. at 9.
322
Id. at 12.
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involving penetration, and even rape may not provide physical
evidence because children heal quickly and the crime is often
reported well after it occurred. The fact that children disclose
in stages also increases the likelihood of inconsistencies in the
child’s testimony.
In addition, questioning by a family
member, doctor, psychologist, or police officer may be perceived
as leading, producing unreliable answers. Like domestic
violence victims, children often recant. Thus, the testimony of
young children is viewed more skeptically by jurors than that
of adults because of concerns over suggestibility, manipulation,
coaching, or confusing fact with fantasy. 323 Similarly, a study
by Professor Myers, a leading expert concerning child abuse,
noted a higher reversal for hearsay introduced in child abuse
than other types of cases. 324
Unlike domestic violence, some argue that Crawford
will have a minimal impact on child abuse trials because such
cases may not be winnable in the absence of the child, and
therefore prosecutors had always been selective in their choice
of cases. For example, another study by Professor Myers of
forty-two child sexual abuse trials found that child witnesses
testified live in court in each trial, “suggesting that prosecutors
are reluctant to take child sexual abuse cases to trial unless
the victim is available to testify.” 325 In this regard, Maryland v.
Craig permits prosecutors to have some children testify from a
different location via some type of television arrangement or
simply placed in the courtroom with a screening device, if they
can demonstrate particularized need showing that the child
would be fearful of testifying in the defendant’s presence. 326 To
the extent that Crawford does not result in revisiting Craig,
this also ensures cross-examination for testimonial statements.
While empirical data appears to suggest that when children
are shielded their reliability increases, the downside is that the
jury may find the child less credible. 327
323
See generally Myrna S. Raeder, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis:
Ohio’s Efforts to Protect Children Without Eviscerating the Rights of Criminal
Defendants—Evidentiary Considerations and the Rebirth of Confrontation Clause
Analysis in Child Abuse Cases, 25 U. TOL. L. REV. 43 (1994) [hereinafter Raeder,
Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis].
324
John E.B. Myers et al., Hearsay Exceptions: Adjusting the Ratio of
Intuition to Psychological Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 44-45 (2002).
325
John E.B. Myers et al., Jurors’ Perceptions of Hearsay in Child Sexual
Abuse Cases, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 388, 411 (1999).
326
497 U.S. 836, 855 (1990).
327
See Dorothy F. Marsil et al., Child Witness Policy: Law Interfacing with
Social Science, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 209, 238-39 (2002).
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Over the years, a number of decisions have involved
absent child witnesses, including two of the most important
Roberts’ progeny: Wright and White. Generally, children may
be deemed incompetent due to an inability to discern truth
from falsity, or because they cannot communicate with the
jury. In addition, some prosecutors, parents, and psychologists
believe that requiring a child to testify revictimizes the child
and inflicts additional trauma that may result in slowing the
child’s recovery. While the empirical basis for this claim is not
decisive, 328 many believe that children should only be subjected
to cross-examination when there is no other viable
alternative. 329 Ironically, some children recover more quickly
when the jury validates their testimony by convicting the
defendant, and are retraumatized by an acquittal, factors not
part of any Confrontation Clause analysis. 330
Whether or not the child testifies, child abuse cases, like
domestic violence cases, rely heavily on excited utterances and
exceptions for medical diagnosis and treatment. However,
even given expansive interpretations of those exceptions, when
a child is the declarant, virtually every state has a child
hearsay exception, or uses a catch-all to permit hearsay that
would otherwise be barred.
Twenty states allow such
exceptions regardless of whether the child-witness is or is not
available to testify; four states allow the exceptions only if the
child is available to testify; and eight states allow the
exceptions only if the child is unavailable to testify. 331 Some
states have also adopted exceptions that apply to the
videotaping of child interviews typically by law enforcement,
psychologists, social workers or others employed by the local
child services agency. 332 This is designed to show juries that
328

See, e.g., Gail D. Cecchettini-Whaley, Note, Children as Witnesses after
Maryland v. Craig, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1993 (1992) (surveying psychological literature);
see also JOHN E.B. MYERS, 1 MYERS ON EVIDENCE IN CHILD, DOMESTIC AND ELDER
ABUSE CASES 135 (2005) (discussing psychological research).
329
See, e.g., John E.B. Myers, The Child Sexual Abuse Literature: A Call for
Greater Objectivity, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1709, 1724 (1990) (challenging the stereotype
that claims “[f]or most victims, confrontation with the legal system is a second and
separate trauma, a process of revictimization”).
330
See, e.g., Rachel I. Wollitzer, Sixth Amendment - Defendant’s Right to
Confront Witnesses: Constitutionality of Protective Measures in Child Sexual Assault
Cases, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 759, 785-86 (1988); Cecchettini-Whaley, supra
note 328, at 2005 (surveying psychological literature).
331
TASK FORCE ON CHILD WITNESSES, AM. BAR ASS’N CRIMINAL JUST.
SECTION, THE CHILD WITNESS IN CRIMINAL CASES 40 (2002).
332
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-37-4-6 (2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02.
(2000); MO. ANN. STAT. § 492.304; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.071 (2005).
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the child has not been mislead by suggestive questioning
techniques, when the child does not testify.
B.

The Effect of Mandatory Reporting Requirements

Regardless of which exception the hearsay is admitted
under, after Crawford, if a child does not testify, the deciding
factor for confrontation analysis is whether the statement is
considered testimonial. This is complicated by a characteristic
not as prevalent in domestic violence cases: the existence of
mandatory reporting of child abuse in all fifty states. 333 Most
states specify which professionals are required to report, and
many have increased the list of mandatory reporters to include
nurses, dentists, social workers, school personnel, childcare
providers, law enforcement officers, clergymen, and even
pharmacists, firefighters, and paramedics. 334 As previously
mentioned, approximately eighteen states require any person
who suspects abuse to report it to the proper authorities. 335
Ironically, after years of being troubled by arguably
unreliable child hearsay being admitted pursuant to White, my
difficulty with Crawford is not that hearsay accusing a
defendant will be received as nontestimonial because the child
is too young to understand its accusatory content. Now, any
child hearsay coming in under an ad hoc exception will
typically require trustworthiness and if shoehorned into a
tradition exception, the defendant is no worse off than under
White. Instead, I am distressed that a testimonial approach
undoes the entire way in which we currently approach child
abuse cases. 336 In other words, mandatory reporting arguably
makes any reporter a government proxy, virtually excluding all
hearsay of unavailable children. I have been surprised that
some courts make no mention of these statutes in analyzing
whether a child’s statements are testimonial. For example, in
State v. Vaught the statement of a victim to a physician that
“[defendant] put his finger in her pee-pee” was not considered
testimonial. 337
333
See generally CURRENT TRENDS IN CHILD MALTREATMENT REPORTING
LAWS, supra note 316, at 1.
334
Id. at 3-4.
335
Id. at 4-5, 5 n.16.
336
See Hutton, supra note 102, at 70-71.
337
682 N.W.2d 284, 286, 291 (Neb. 2004); accord State v. Scacchetti, 690
N.W.2d 393, 397 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (statement to nurse practitioner who identified
child after emergency room physician suspected abuse).
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Similarly, in People v. Cage, a case involving an older
child who suffered a substantial cut in a dispute with his
mother, the court found statements made to a doctor were
nontestimonial because the objective reasonable person test
asks whether a reasonable person would have expected his
statements to the doctor to be used prosecutorially. 338 The Cage
court viewed the possibility that someone would pass
information to police as not enough, completely ignoring that in
many jurisdictions the doctor has an obligation to report
physical as well as sexual abuse of children. Indeed the
Department of Justice’s Law Enforcement Guide suggests that
to encourage reluctant physicians to get involved in cases of
abuse, they should be reminded that “all 50 States and the
District of Columbia have enacted legislation regarding
immunity from civil or criminal liability for persons who, in
good faith, make or participate in making a report of child
abuse or neglect.” 339
I have always questioned the admissibility of a
statement by a child abuse victim attributing fault to a
member of the victim’s immediate household under the medical
exception. However, many states view such statements as
relevant to the prevention of recurrence of injury to the child. 340
Therefore, I am not troubled that such statements would likely
be suppressed under a true testimonial approach.
In contrast, more traditional symptoms and descriptions
of medical problems may now be transformed into testimonial
statements unless courts view the accusation narrowly as just
including the identification of the perpetrator, as opposed to
explaining the nature of the injuries caused. In re T.T., 341 made
this distinction and considered statements as nontestimonial
where they did not accuse or identify the perpetrator of the
assault. Therefore, the child’s explanation of how she was
penetrated, descriptions of the pain, and the offender’s use of a
lubricant were relevant in assessing how the doctor reached
her opinion that G.F. sustained sexual abuse and was in accord
338

15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 846, 855 (Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, 99 P.3d 2 (Cal.

2004).
339
OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUST. AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUST., LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE 8 (reprint 2001) (1997).
340
State v. Sims, 890 P.2d 521, 523 (Wash. Ct. App. 1995); Blake v. State, 933
P.2d 474, 477 n.2 (Wyo. 1997) (“[A]n overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, including
at least thirty-two states and four federal circuits, allow into evidence statements
regarding the identity of the perpetrator in child physical or sexual assault cases.”).
341
815 N.E.2d 789, 804 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
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with the statutory hearsay exception for statements, made by a
patient with a selfish interest in treatment, for the purpose of
medical diagnosis and treatment:
Those statements were not accusatory against respondent at the
time made and, thus, do not trigger enhanced protection under the
confrontation clause. Respondent’s primary focus on G.F.’s entire
statement to Dr. Lorand as testimonial, because an objective witness
would reasonably believe the statement would be available for use at
a later trial, misses the mark. Such an analysis overlooks the
crucial “witnesses against” phrase of the confrontation clause and
casts too wide a net in categorizing nonaccusatory statements by
sexual assault victims to medical personnel as implicating the
confrontation clause’s core concerns regarding government
production of ex parte evidence against a criminal defendant. 342

Not all courts agree. In People v. Vigil, 343 a child’s
hearsay statements to a physician were deemed testimonial
where the physician questioned the child and was a member of
a child protection team and a frequent prosecution witness in
child abuse cases. As a result, the doctor could only testify
regarding his observations and physical findings. State v.
Fisher 344 attempted to harmonize some of the conflicting cases
by noting a distinction as to whether the statements to a
physician are made for forensic as opposed to treatment
purposes, but overlooked the effect of mandatory reporting
requirements in its analysis. While I would expect the defense
bar to argue that statements to all mandatory reporters are
testimonial, an absolute ban on all statements made to medical
personnel concerning child abuse would be quite troubling.
Looking to the nature of the statement appears more in
keeping with Crawford when the physician is not part of a
prosecutorial forensic team or otherwise motivated to obtain an
accusatory statement.
C.

Children Aren’t Required to Understand the Accusatory
Effect of Their Statements

Although it has been argued that the developmental
literature indicates that young children do not reasonably
understand that statements made in forensic interviews would

342

Id.
104 P.3d 258, 265-66 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, No. 04SC532,
2004 WL 2926003 (Colo. Dec. 20, 2004).
344
108 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
343
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be used at trial, 345 courts appear to be using the objective
observer standard, rather than focusing on the child’s
expectations. While State v. Snowden 346 imposed an objective
person test, it rejected use of an objective child, which would
have insulated “statements by a young child made in an
environment and under circumstances in which the
investigators clearly contemplated use of the statements at a
later trial.” Snowden called such an approach “an exception
that we are not prepared to recognize.” People v. Sisavath also
rejected the notion that “an ‘objective witness’ should be taken
to mean an objective witness in the same category of persons as
the actual witness—here, an objective four-year-old.” 347
Even disclosures to close family members could be
considered testimonial under the objective observer approach.
For example, the In re E.H. 348 court found complaints to the
children’s grandmother were testimonial because they were the
impetus for filing the petition against E.H. and were
accusatory statements offered at trial. In contrast, People v.
R.F. 349 made a blanket holding that statements of a child to
family members are not testimonial. The California Supreme
Court in People v. Griffin also noted that a child victim’s
statements to a friend at school were not testimonial and
provided no further explanation. 350 State v. Purvis 351 noted that
the fact that parents turn over information about crimes to the
police “does not transform their interactions with their children
into police investigations.” 352 Given the tendency of many
courts to treat statements to private individuals as
nontestimonial regardless of the type of case, 353 it may be that a

345
Allie Phillips, Child Forensic Interviews after Crawford v. Washington:
Testimonial or Not?, 39 PROSECUTOR 17 (Aug. 2005) (arguing for a reasonable child
standard and rejecting an objective person standard for children under the age of 10).
346
867 A.2d 314, 329 (Md. 2005).
347
13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 758 n.3 (Ct. App. 2004); accord State v. Grace, 111
P.3d 28, 38 (Haw. Ct. App. 2005).
348
823 N.E.2d 1029 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005), cert. granted, No. 100202, 2005 Ill.
LEXIS 814 (May 25, 2005).
349
825 N.E.2d 287, 295 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
350
93 P.3d 344, 372 n.19 (Cal. 2004).
351
829 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005).
352
Id. at 579.
353
See, e.g., State v. Aaron L., 865 A.2d 1135, 1145 n.21 (Conn. 2005) (finding
a statement of a two-and-a-half-year-old victim to mother was not testimonial);
Herrera-Vega v. State, 888 So. 2d 66, 69 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004) (finding a
spontaneous statement of three year old child to mother was not testimonial, nor was
repetition of that statement to father minutes later); State v. Manuel, 697 N.W.2d 811,
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significant amount of child hearsay will still be admissible
because family members are typically the ones to whom abuse
is originally disclosed.
D.

Crawford’s Impact on Multidisciplinary Forensic Teams

Crawford appears to undo the use of multidisciplinary
teams in child abuse, which the Department of Justice has
encouraged for the last ten years. In this approach “[s]ocial
workers, physicians, therapists, prosecutors, judges and police
officers all have important roles to play.” 354 Interagency
protocols are encouraged with guidelines indicating the role of
each of the principal agencies. 355 Indeed, this effort has been
extremely successful. More than forty states have legislation
concerning joint investigation and cooperation between law
enforcement
and
social
services
and
authorizing
356
multidisciplinary teams.
Such teams have been instrumental in improving the
skills of interviewers and reducing the number of interviews.
Professor Myers indicates that reducing interviews ensures
that vulnerable children are not put under additional stress
and lowers the likelihood that unnecessarily suggestive
questions will be asked. 357 Now Crawford has turned these best
practices into a textbook for creating testimonial statements
when the child does not testify. Indeed, statements to a
Department of Children and Family Services’ (DCFS) agent
have been found to be testimonial. “[W]here DCFS works at
the behest of and in tandem with the State’s Attorney with the
intent and purpose of assisting in the prosecutorial effort of an
alleged sexual assault on a child, DCFS functions as an agent
822-23 (Wis. 2005) (discussing general case law and finding statement to girlfriend not
testimonial).
354
LAW ENFORCEMENT RESPONSE TO CHILD ABUSE 1, supra note 339, at 3.
355
Id. See generally THE GREENBOOK NATIONAL EVALUATION TEAM, THE
GREENBOOK DEMONSTRATION INITIATIVE INTERIM EVALUATION REPORT, at
app. A (Dec. 2004), available at http://www.thegreenbook.info/documents/
Greenbook_Interim_Evaluation_Report_2_05.pdf (listing recommendations from
federal initiative to address domestic violence and child maltreatment).
356
Legislation
Mandating
or
Authorizing
the
Creation
of
Multidisciplinary/Multi-Agency
Child
Protection
Teams
(current
as
of
November
5,
2004),
available
at
http://www.ndaa-apri.org/pdf/
statutes_legislation_mandating_multidisciplinary_teams_2004.pdf (last visited Oct. 2,
2005).
357
John E.B. Myers et al., Psychological Research on Children as Witnesses:
Practical Implications for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3,
17 (1996).
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of the prosecution.” 358 Similarly, in In re Rolandis G., 359 where
the child made a statement describing the sexual abuse to a
child advocacy worker while a police officer watched through a
“two-way mirror” the court held that the statement was
testimonial. 360 Most recently, State v. Snowden 361 found a
statement testimonial where it resulted from a joint
investigation by the Montgomery County Police Department
and the Child Protective Services for Montgomery County.
While I do not disagree with these decisions on legal grounds, it
is clear that we must recognize that statements made to
multidisciplinary teams will not be admitted unless the child
testifies. As a result, we must think about how to ensure such
testimony or otherwise provide admissible evidence to protect
our most vulnerable children.
Similarly, post-Crawford, videotaped interviews by
forensic teams have generally been found to be testimonial. 362
United States v. Bordeaux 363 specifically noted that because the
statements may also have “a medical purpose does not change
the fact that they were testimonial, because Crawford does not
indicate, and logic does not dictate, that multi-purpose
statements cannot be testimonial.” Professor Mosteller has
discussed the possibility that videotaped interviews will fall
into disuse since they will not provide an avenue for admission
of the child’s statement. 364 I am more hopeful, for two reasons.
First, because such statutes typically apply to children who
testify as well as to those who do not, the prosecutor will still
have an incentive to bolster the credibility of testifying children
by showing their interviews were nonsuggestive. While I
recognize the counter to this is that prosecutors may want to
hide suggestive interviews, I think that jurors may question
358

In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789, 801 (2004).
817 N.E.2d 183 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
360
Id. at 188.
361
867 A.2d 314, 330 (Md. 2005).
362
See, e.g., People v. Vigil, 104 P.3d 258, 262 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004), cert.
granted, No. 04SC532, 2004 WL 2926003 (Colo. Dec 20, 2004); In re R.A.S., 111 P.3d
487 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (child victim’s statements to police investigator during
forensic interview were testimonial); State v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 2004) (en banc)
(child witness’s statements to government caseworker during police-directed interview
were testimonial). But see People v. Geno, 683 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004)
(child victim’s response to interviewer’s question was not testimonial where
interviewer was not government employee), cert denied, 688 N.W.2d 829 (2004). See
also State v. Davis, 613 S.E.2d 760, 775-76 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (summarizing child
abuse cases).
363
400 F.3d 548, 556 (8th Cir. 2005).
364
Mosteller, supra note 14, at 529-30.
359
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the absence of videotapes when the technology is available.
Moreover, I do not believe that prosecutors want to manipulate
children into believing they are abused if in fact they are not,
and they have an interest in ensuring best practices for
forensic interviews. Second, the empirical evidence indicates
that in actual trials, jurors rated the videotaped interview as
important in their decision to believe the child victim/witness
at trial. 365
E.

Opportunity for Cross-Examination of Child Witnesses

Post-Crawford, if a child does not testify, the chances of
winning at trial plummet because significant types of child
hearsay will be eliminated. After years of worrying about too
much child hearsay being admitted via traditional exceptions
so that it receives no reliability check, I have come full circle
and wonder how we can provide any justice to abused children
who do not testify. Because some of these children are very
young, they might not meet even minimal competency
standards. At least seven states currently provide for victims
of child abuse to testify without any finding of competency. 366
Yet do these provide for an opportunity for effective crossexamination?
This is not an academic issue. Pre-Crawford, the Ninth
Circuit upheld the admission of cross-examined videotaped
testimony of a child, finding that the “[i]ncapacity to
understand the duty to testify truthfully does not automatically
offend the Confrontation Clause when the witness in question
is a young child.” 367 In contrast, Purvis v. State 368 found that a
witness who is unable to appreciate the obligation to testify
truthfully cannot be effectively cross-examined for Crawford
purposes. The child in Purvis was incompetent due to being
developmentally disabled. 369 This disability did not prevent the
court from upholding the admission of the child’s
nontestimonial statements, which were cross-examined at a
hearing held pursuant to the state’s Protected Persons
Statute. 370 This issue was deferred in State v. Carothers, 371
365
366
367
368
369
370

Myers et al., supra note 325.
Lyon, supra note 8, at 1023.
Walters v. McCormick, 122 F.3d 1172, 1175 (9th Cir. 1997).
829 N.E.2d 572, 581 (2005).
Id. at 577.
Id. at 584-85.

384

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 71:1

since the court found a confrontation claim to be premature
where the defendant argued that the four-year-old child would
be unable to remember and testify at the time of trial as to the
statements she gave to a child advocate, to law enforcement
and to her mother. Obviously, this question is bound to recur
in other cases.
Despite Owens, which rejected a confrontation challenge
for declarants who testify, defendants have sensed that their
best challenge to a testifying child is to claim that the
opportunity for cross-examination was not adequate. United
States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 372 a pre-Crawford opinion,
indicated that if “a child is so young that she cannot be crossexamined at all, or if she is ‘simply too young and too
frightened to be subjected to a thorough direct or crossexamination’[,] the fact that she is physically present in the
courtroom should not, in and of itself, satisfy the demands of
the Clause.”
Most courts appear to interpret Crawford as not
requiring memory of all of the particulars of the abuse. For
example, State v. McClanahan 373 held that a second grader
subject to substantial cross-examination did not pose a
confrontation problem. In other words, the fact that a child’s
memory may be imperfect does not make her ‘unavailable’ as a
witness for the purposes of the Confrontation Clause. In People
v. Harless, 374 although a child’s memory at the time of trial was
somewhat selective, her partial failure of recollection did not
prevent her from explaining her prior statements or preclude
the jury from assessing her demeanor and determining
whether her prior statements or her trial testimony was more
credible. Accordingly, the defendant was found to have an
opportunity for effective cross-examination.
Not responding to a handful of questions also does not
render the child unavailable. 375 Although in State v. Yanez, 376
the child did not remember what she told the adults or what
the defendant did to her, the court found her available for
Confrontation Clause purposes, permitting the admission of
371
372
373
374

692 N.W.2d 544, 549 (S.D. 2005).
933 F.2d 1471, 1474 (8th Cir. 1991) (internal citations omitted).
No. 50866-1-I, 2004 WL 723283, at *4 (Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 2004).
22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 637 (Ct. App. 2004), cert. granted, 26 Cal. Rptr. 3d

568 (2005).
375
376

State v. McKinney, 699 N.W.2d 471, 480 (S.D. 2005).
No. A04-276, 2005 WL 894649, at *3 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2005).
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her videotaped statements to a social worker and deputy that
included graphic descriptions of the abuse. A similar result
occurred in State v. Price. 377
People v. Sharp 378 demonstrates how a seemingly wise
defense strategy can backfire. The defense decided to forego
cross-examination about specifics of the alleged abuse after the
child failed to respond on direct to the details of the abuse.
Because the child answered all of the questions the defense
posed on cross-examination, the court held that her statements
were governed by Owens, rather than Crawford. 379 Sharp left
open what legal consequences would ensue if she had answered
some, but not all, of those questions. 380 It is troubling that the
uncommon situation in Owens, of a testifying adult having no
memory of the incident, may now becoming commonplace when
young children testify.
A few post-Crawford cases have found Confrontation
Clause violations despite the child’s presence at trial. In People
v. Couturier, 381 limiting the cross-examination of a child witness
at trial, concerning questions about notes that she wrote to the
defendant after the alleged abuse saying she loved and missed
him, violated the defendant’s right of confrontation where there
was no corroborating physical evidence or witness testimony,
making the trial a credibility contest. In re T.T. found a child
was unavailable to testify after she froze on the stand when
asked to recount the alleged incidents of abuse. 382 Although the
child responded to general questions from prosecutor about her
family and school, and explained how she came to be at alleged
perpetrator’s house on the dates of the alleged assaults, when
questions became more specific regarding the assaults, she
stopped answering questions, even after a recess was taken so
that her mother could console her. 383
Some challenges arise in the context of a child who
testifies at a preliminary hearing, but not at trial, since
Crawford permits testimonial statements of an unavailable
declarant if there was an opportunity for prior cross-

377

110 P.3d 1171, 1175 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005).
825 N.E.2d 706, 713 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005).
379
Id.
380
Id.
381
No. 252175, 2005 WL 323680 (Mich. Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2005) vacated, 704
N.W.2d 463 (Mich. 2005).
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In re T.T., 815 N.E.2d 789 (Ill. App. Ct. 2004).
383
Id. at 797-98.
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examination. In People v. Osio, 384 where a child testified to only
one of seven counts at the preliminary hearing, the opportunity
for cross-examination was considered insufficient. Similarly, in
Bockting v. Bayer 385 the Ninth Circuit recently held that
admission of a child’s hearsay statement to a detective
warranted habeas relief where the statement was critical in
view of the victim’s testimony at the preliminary hearing
claiming not to remember what happened.
Although the evolving case law on adequacy of crossexamination is not necessarily consistent, the findings appear
highly fact-specific. Ultimately, a number of children who are
found incompetent or freeze are rendered voiceless not because
of their own inability to testify, but because lawyers and judges
treat these children like mini adults who they assume will
understand language and concepts that are developmentally
inappropriate. 386 Given Crawford, the goal should not be to
obtain less child hearsay, or do away with forensic interviews,
or attempt to avoid the testimonial ban, but rather to make a
more concerted effort to ensure that children are comfortable in
the courtroom and able to testify. 387
F.

The Intersection of Craig and Crawford

To the extent that a child is afraid to testify in the
presence of the defendant, prosecutors must continue to rely on
Maryland v. Craig. 388 So far, there has been no frontal judicial
attack on Craig even though Crawford clearly has a vision of
the Confrontation Clause that rejects the type of balancing
approach that Craig applied. 389 It must be remembered,
however, that Craig requires that the child must be
“traumatized, not by the courtroom generally, but by the
presence of the defendant.” 390 Thus, where that element is
unclear, a Confrontation Clause violation will be established.
It appears that some courts are including any trauma induced
384

No. H026953, 2005 WL 1231402, at *7 (Cal. Ct. App. May 25, 2005).
399 F.3d 1010, 1022 (9th Cir. 2005).
386
See, e.g., Thomas D. Lyon et al., Reducing Maltreated Children’s
Relunctance to Answer Hypothetical Oath-Taking Competency Questions, 25 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 81 (2001).
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See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 8, at 1071; ANN M. HARALAMBIE, CHILD SEXUAL
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by testifying in their evaluation. For example, the Military
Rules of Evidence explicitly requires remote testimony for
children who literally could not meet the Craig standard. 391 In
United States v. Turning Bear, 392 a pre-Crawford case,
testimony via closed circuit television was found to violate the
Confrontation Clause because the decision was based in part on
the child’s fear of the jury, rather than of testifying in the
presence of her father. This holding was reaffirmed postCrawford in United States v. Bordeaux, which also involved
testimony via closed circuit television that was permitted
where the child’s fear related in part to testifying in front of a
jury. 393 The court in Bordeaux also noted “‘confrontation’ via a
two-way closed circuit television is not constitutionally
equivalent to face-to-face confrontation.” 394
Courts vary significantly about the nature and extent of
the showing justifying in-court restrictions, as well as who can
establish it. 395 Some judges have even permitted prosecutors to
make the representation concerning trauma, although one well
respected commentator has recommended that the judge talk
to the child. 396 Justices Scalia and Thomas have dissented from
the denial of certiorari in two cases involving interpretation of
Craig that they characterized as “confrontation-via-TV.” 397 In
one, a fifteen-year-old teenager indicated she was not afraid of
the defendant, but “can’t be near him.” 398 The other protected a
child whose mother and doctor indicated that the six-year-old
wanted to testify and because the testimony would be limited
to another girl’s abuse, not her own, neither expected the child
to suffer additional emotional distress. 399

391
See Major Edward J. O’Brien, Are Courts Martial Ready for Prime Time?
Televised Testimony and Other Developments in the Law of Confrontation, 2000 ARMY
LAW. 63, 66-67 (May 2000).
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357 F.3d 730, 736 (8th Cir. 2004).
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Id. at 554.
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See Dorothy F. Marsil et al., Child Witness Policy: Law Interfacing with
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396
See Jean Montoya, Lessons from Akiki and Michaels on Shielding Child
Witnesses, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 340, 342-43, 356-66 (1995).
397
Marx v. Texas, 953 S.W.2d 321 (Tex. App. 1997), aff’d, 987 S.W.2d 577
(Tex. Crim. App. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1034 (1999).
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Forfeiture in Child Abuse Cases

Forfeiture can also play a role in child abuse cases.
However, the difficulty is that often the child is pressured by
the parent who is not the defendant, typically the mother. This
occurs because the abuse may result in the mother having to
make a choice of living with her male intimate and having the
child removed from the home, or giving up the male to retain
custody of her child. Because the penalties for child abuse are
so great, on occasion the family refuses to believe the child.
Similarly, children who are old enough to understand the
ramifications of making the complaint may recognize at some
point that they would rather live at home than be placed in
foster care. Another issue that arises concerning forfeiture is
that most abusers tell the child to keep their relationship a
secret, and some abusers threaten the child to prevent
disclosure. 400 If the child’s unwillingness to testify results from
those original threats, the threats should be admissible to
demonstrate forfeiture even though the tampering was prior to
disclosure. However, if the child is otherwise incompetent, the
coercion does not supply a direct link to any witness tampering
at trial.
H.

Reassessing the Admission of Child Abuse Evidence

States have been fairly aggressive in permitting expert
evidence and prior acts of defendants in child sex abuse cases.
Advances in medical technology may also produce physical
evidence of abuse. However, jurors still expect to hear from the
child. Elsewhere, I have discussed what I view as the
appropriate use of expert testimony and prior acts of criminal
defendants in child abuse cases, 401 but Crawford’s impact
cannot be overstated in cases where children do not testify.
Because the multidisciplinary approach to interviewing
children is an important feature of child abuse litigation, more
attention must be given to qualifying children as witnesses,
and preparing them so that they do not freeze when testifying.

400
See Tom Harbinson, Using the Crawford v. Washington “Forfeiture by
Wrongdoing” Confrontation Clause Exception in Child Abuse Cases, 1 REASONABLE
EFFORTS 3 (2004), available at http://www.ndaa-apri.org/publications/newsletters/
reasonable_efforts_volume_1_number_3_2004.html.
401
See Raeder, Navigating Between Scylla and Charybdis, supra note 323.
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CONCLUSION

Whether Crawford’s impact on domestic violence and
child abuse prosecutions was intended or not, it is significant.
Unlike Abigail Adams, the ladies will not sit by quietly asking
to be remembered. 402 Instead, the advocates on behalf of
battered women and abused children should view Crawford as
an opportunity to reassess current practices and restructure
the way in which the criminal justice system responds to these
cases.

402

Letter from Abigail Adams to John Adams (March 31, 1776), in 1 ADAMS
FAMILY CORRESPONDENCE 370 (L.H. Butterfield et al. eds., 1963) (“In the new Code of
Laws which I suppose it will be necessary for you to make I desire you would
Remember the Ladies, and be more generous and favourable to them than your
ancestors.”).

